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ABSTRACT: The twin notions of exclusion and possession dominate our 
cultural and legal conceptions of property. This Article uses the lens of 
hedonics—the emergent science of happiness—to make a case for the less 
appreciated notions of inclusion and dispossession. Evidence from this new 
field shows that owners maximize their welfare, not when they amass land 
and chattels and keep others away from them, but when they pursue the polar-
opposite strategies of inclusion and dispossession, such as sharing their 
property, donating it to charity, or giving it away. This Article begins its 
defense of inclusion and dispossession by providing background about the 
idea of happiness and law, an increasingly important conceptual framework 
for welfarist analysis of law and policy. It then reviews the hedonics evidence 
about property, which reveals that despite the hegemony of exclusion and 
possession, what increases owners’ subjective well-being is using their property 
to create social ties, to give it to a meaningful cause, or just to get rid of it. 
The Article then considers specific strategies of inclusion and dispossession. 
The Article reveals unappreciated ways that inclusion and dispossession 
enhance owners’ subjective well-being, and then suggests particular forms of 
choice architecture that have the potential to optimize the overall social welfare 
produced by each of them. Finally, this Article concludes by considering the 
implications for property theory of the novel notions of inclusion and 
dispossession, emphasizing that this claim works to enrich, not undermine, 
the institution of private ownership. 
 
 
 * Professor of Law and Assistant Dean for Faculty Development, University of Houston 
Law Center. Thanks to Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Zack Bray, Lee Ann Fennell, Brian Frye, Thomas 
Mitchell, James Nelson, Michael Pollack, Mark Roark, Jessica L. Roberts, Dru Stevenson, Jessica 
Dixon Weaver, and Kellen Zale, as well as participants in the 2016 Texas Legal Scholars 
Conference and the 2017 Texas A&M Property Schmooze, as well as faculty workshops at the 
South Texas College of Law and the University of Kentucky College of Law for thoughtful 
suggestions about this project. 
A1_FAGUNDES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/2018  5:31 PM 
1362 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1361 
I.  INTRODUCTION: INCLUSION & DISPOSSESSION IN  
PROPERTY LAW ............................................................................ 1362 
II.  THE HEDONIC UPSIDES OF INCLUSION AND DISPOSSESSION ...... 1368 
A. HAPPINESS & THE LAW: A BRIEF OVERVIEW ........................... 1368 
B. INCLUSION, DISPOSSESSION, AND HAPPINESS ........................... 1372 
C. TOWARD INCLUSION AND DISPOSSESSION ................................ 1379 
III.  HAPPINESS, INCLUSION, AND THE SHARING ECONOMY ............... 1380 
A. PROPERTY, SHARING, AND REGULATION ................................. 1380 
B. SHARING AS HAPPINESS: FOUR EXAMPLES ............................... 1382 
1. True Sharing ................................................................ 1383 
2. Disintermediation ....................................................... 1385 
3. Community .................................................................. 1386 
4. Access over Ownership ............................................... 1389 
C. TOWARD HAPPIER SHARING ................................................... 1390 
IV.  HAPPINESS AND CHARITABLE GIVING ......................................... 1394 
A. THE HEDONIC CASE AGAINST THE CHARITY DEDUCTION ........ 1395 
B. CHOICE ARCHITECTURE FOR HAPPIER DONATION ................... 1398 
1. Pure Libertarian Approaches ..................................... 1398 
2. Libertarian-Paternalist Approaches ........................... 1399 
V.  HAPPINESS, LAW, AND THE NEW MINIMALISM ............................ 1403 
A. THE JOY OF NOTHING: MINIMALISM & HAPPINESS ................. 1403 
B. MINIMIZING PROPERTY THROUGH LAW ................................. 1408 
1. Libertarian Non-Intervention .................................... 1408 
2. Nudges ......................................................................... 1409 
3. Legal Status .................................................................. 1410 
4. Targeted Abandonment ............................................. 1413 
VI.  CONCLUSION: IN [QUALIFIED] DEFENSE OF EXCLUSION  
& POSSESSION ............................................................................. 1416 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: INCLUSION & DISPOSSESSION IN PROPERTY LAW 
The twin notions of possession and exclusion lie at the center of our 
cultural and legal understanding of property. Consider the American 
obsession with possession. We recently elected a President with no experience 
holding a public office to a large extent based on widespread admiration for 
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his great wealth.1 Television shows from Antiques Roadshow to Flipping Out 
to Top Gear also fetishize having both real property and chattels.2 In fact, 
many of America’s leading industries are devoted to protecting and 
enhancing possession: the financial industry, which seeks to grow extant 
wealth into even more of it; the insurance industry, which seeks to protect 
people against the loss of their property; and even assorted businesses that 
allow people to showcase and warehouse the things they accumulate 
throughout their lives.3  
Possession is also central to our legal understanding of property. Leading 
property scholars from Carol Rose to Richard Epstein consider the notion of 
possession central to and inextricable from the idea of property itself.4 The 
doctrines of first possession and adverse possession, while rarely invoked in 
practical terms, occupy a disproportionate amount of space in the first-year 
property curriculum and in law reviews.5 And while the hoary cliché that 
“possession is nine tenths of the law” is not quite right, it does reflect a notion 
that actual possession of property gives a purported owner a strong 
presumptive case to legal title.6 In light of all this, it is unsurprising that Jill 
Fraley recently observed that legal “theorists . . . obsess over possession.”7 
If any notion can compete with possession’s stranglehold on how we 
think about property, it is exclusion. The intuition that we should be able to 
 
 1. Michael McGrath, Why Voters Love Donald Trump’s Wealth—but Despised Mitt Romney’s, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2016, 4:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/mar/15/ 
donald-trump-wealth-money-mitt-romney. 
 2. Indeed, the national preoccupation with owning stuff has even resulted in its own 
pathology—hoarding—where people acquire and keep things compulsively in much the same 
way that alcoholics guzzle booze (which disorder has also become a point of public fascination so 
great that it too has led to a TV show devoted to it, Hoarders). 
 3. Examples include the Container Store, which sells only things to store other things, as well as 
the vast storage industry, which rents out space for the many people who can no longer fit all their stuff 
in their home or garage. For a fascinating account of how Americans continue to run out of space for 
their things even as houses grow ever larger, see JOHN DE GRAAF ET AL., AFFLUENZA: HOW OVER-
CONSUMPTION IS KILLING US—AND HOW TO FIGHT BACK 28–33 (3d ed. 2014). 
 4. Compare Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1221 (1979), 
with Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 74–75 (1985). 
 5. For example, the leading 1L property text devotes nearly 50 pages to adverse possession 
alone, despite not featuring a major case decided after the 1970s. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., 
PROPERTY 116–64 (7th ed. 2010).  
 6. The Roman doctrine of uti possidetis entitled possessors in property disputes to occupy 
the property unless and until it was determined not to belong to them. John Duncan, Uti 
Possidetis: Is Possession Really Nine-Tenths of the Law? The Acquisition of Territory by the United States: 
Why, How, and Should We?, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 513, 513 (2007). In American folklore, a judge 
is said to have invoked this notion in a dispute between the feuding Hatfields and McCoys, 
awarding ownership of title in a pig to its possessor, Floyd Hatfield, since no credible evidence 
could show that the McCoys lacked title.  
 7. Jill Fraley, The Meaning of Dispossession, 50 IND. L.J. 517, 518 (2017). 
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exclude others from our land matches with deep-rooted instincts.8 One 
modern expression of the drive toward exclusion is the proliferation of gated 
developments, often featuring manned security entrances, sold to buyers as 
“exclusive communities.”9 The burgeoning home security industry feeds this 
desire for exclusion by selling alarm systems, security cameras, and signs 
designed to enforce the exclusivity of our real property. These modern trends 
find a historical analog in early cases expressing ambivalence—and sometimes 
outright approval—of “spring guns” designed to kill any intruder who as 
much as opened a strange door without permission.10  
The notion of exclusion similarly preoccupies property theorists. 
Scholars readily concede that exclusion is central to the idea of property;11 
the only question is whether it is merely one of a handful of rights that 
comprise the legal notion of ownership or the defining feature of property 
itself.12 The idea that exclusion is central to property goes back at least to 
Blackstone, who famously (if inaccurately) referred to property as “that . . . 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in 
the universe.”13 The development of property law tracks this preoccupation 
with exclusion. In the past decade, for example, 32 states have revived the 
castle doctrine under the rubric of “stand your ground.”14 
 
 8. See generally Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Property ‘Instinct,’ 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL 
SOC’Y B 1763 (2004) (summarizing literature and finding commonalities in property-related 
behavior among human and non-human animals). 
 9. For a fascinating treatment of the exclusion-oriented “bunker mentality” of modern 
gated communities, see Rich Benjamin, The Gated Community Mentality, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/opinion/the-gated-community-mentality.html. 
 10. The most famous spring gun case in torts history is Katko v. Briney, in which the Iowa 
Supreme Court held that a landowner had a duty not to set potentially deadly traps for trespassers. 
Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Iowa 1971). In response to the case, though, many states 
sought to pass “Briney bills” to allow landowners to do so, reflecting a widespread popular moral 
approbation of spring guns. 
 11. The recent efflorescence of pluralism and progressive-property theories has emphasized 
values and features of property other than exclusion, but even adherents of this new school agree 
that exclusion has a prominent (even if not sole or prioritized) place in any theory of legal 
ownership. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
1409, 1415 (2012). 
 12. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) 
(“[T]he right to exclude others is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of 
property—it is the sine qua non.”). 
 13. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1–2. While this aphorism remains a popular 
distillation of the essence of property, many scholars have pointed out that it does not even reflect 
Blackstone’s own view of the field at the time, since he used the “despotic dominion” phrasing as 
a jumping-off place to show how owners’ rights were riddled with exceptions. See Carol M. Rose, 
Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603 (1998) (critiquing reliance 
on Blackstone’s famous dictum). 
 14. See Benjamin, supra note 9 (cataloguing this trend). 
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Yet there is, and has long been, a countercurrent to the notion that 
property is predominantly about possession and exclusion. Early Western 
critiques of property ownership emerged in the asceticism of Epictetus and 
other ancients and in the Judeo-Christian tradition.15 The latter in particular 
espoused the moral worth of generosity,16 as well as the more radical notion 
that the very idea of excessive ownership is antithetical to an ethical life.17 
These ideas have analogues even in the affluenza-crazed contemporary West, 
where they animate an emergent opposition to the prevalent culture of 
fetishizing belongings and exclusion. In contrast to cultural data points that 
celebrate maximizing one’s possessions lies the stubborn fact that there are 
countless charities for worthy causes to which Americans donate their money 
and physical property in ever-increasing volumes.18 And however much 
exclusion rules the roost in property theory, the rise of the sharing economy 
illustrates how the value of the things we own can be maximized by including 
others rather than excluding them.19 Finally, a combination of post-recession 
necessity and dissatisfaction with consumerism has led an increasing number 
of Americans to choose minimalist lifestyles that entail reducing down to as 
few possessions as possible,20 as well as choosing to live in small-footprint tiny 
houses or communally oriented micro-housing units.21  
Despite these emerging trends, inclusion and dispossession have not 
gotten nearly as much attention in property scholarship or substantive law as 
exclusion and possession. A handful of property scholars have made gestures 
in this direction,22 but, as yet, no work has answered the fundamental question 
 
 15. EMRYS WESTACOTT, THE WISDOM OF FRUGALITY: WHY LESS IS MORE—MORE OR LESS 
6–20 (2016) (discussing the ancients who lionized simplicity and rejected property, most 
notably the itinerant philosopher Diogenes). 
 16. The New Testament, for example, admonishes that “[i]t is more blessed to give than to 
receive.” Acts 20:35; see also ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 85 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1932) 
(c. 350 B.C.E.) (exhorting the appeal of common property though acknowledging its challenges). 
 17. The Gospel of Matthew, for example, states that “[i]t is easier for a camel to go through 
the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.” Matthew 19:24.  
 18. See Charitable Giving Statistics, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TR., https://www.nptrust.org/ 
philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics (last visited Mar. 11, 2018) (showing upward 
trend in annual giving by U.S. households). 
 19. Rubicon, The Sharing Economy: A New Way of Doing Business, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON 
(Dec. 11, 2015), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-sharing-economy-a-new-way-
of-doing-business (casting the sharing economy as a phenomenon where value derives from 
inclusion rather than exclusion strategies).  
 20. See Alex Williams, Why Self-Help Guru James Altucher Only Owns 15 Things, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/fashion/james-altucher-self-help-guru.html.  
 21. Ronda Kaysen, The Millennial Commune, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2015), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/08/02/realestate/the-millennial-commune.html (discussing micro-housing); 
Alec Wilkinson, Let’s Get Small: The Rise of the Tiny-House Movement, NEW YORKER (July 25, 2011), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/07/25/lets-get-small (discussing tiny houses). 
 22. See, e.g., Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 866–70 (2014) 
(describing ways property law enables inclusion as well as exclusion); Eduardo M. Peñalver, 
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that should underlie the legal and theoretical defenses of exclusion and 
possession: What is the optimal strategy for regulating ownership? Does it 
make us better off when we amass property and exclude others from it? After 
all, a—if not the—fundamental question law must face in making regulatory 
choices is whether or not those choices improve the well-being of those 
affected.23 From a utilitarian perspective,24 if exclusion and possession do not 
make us better off, we should rethink whether these concepts should be so 
central to property law.  
And indeed, a growing body of literature that empirically examines what 
increases our felt sense of well-being suggests that we may have possession and 
exclusion all wrong. Economists and social psychologists who engage in the 
scientific study of happiness—otherwise known as hedonics25—have 
addressed precisely this issue, and their work has yielded a surprising result: 
Keeping property all for ourselves does not improve our subjective sense of 
our own well-being.26 And perhaps even more counterintuitive, what owners 
can do with their property to increase their happiness is to share it or even 
give it away.27 However much self-made wealth represents the American ideal, 
there is a growing body of evidence that spending our money prosocially does 
far more for subjective well-being than acquiring more wealth.28 Moreover, 
despite property law’s emphasis on exclusion, the way to use property to 
increase happiness is not to keep others out, but to let them in: Establishing 
and maintaining social ties, strong and weak alike, is strongly associated with 
increased subjective well-being.29 Finally, giving away property can increase 
happiness by decreasing debt, increasing mobility, and refocusing time and 
attention on rewarding activities rather than mere objects.30  
 
Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1940–41 (2005) (discussing property as a source of social 
bonds and interpersonal connection).  
 23. See JOHN BRONSTEEN ET AL., HAPPINESS & THE LAW 24–25 (2015) (arguing the intuitive 
point that above all, laws seek to, and should seek to, make people better off). 
 24. This Article adopts such a perspective in making its case for inclusion and dispossession 
in property. This framework, discussed in more detail in Part II.A, flows from the simple and 
widely held intuition that law should aspire to improve, on-balance, the lives of those it affects.  
 25. For one good overview of the field of hedonics, see generally RICHARD LAYARD, 
HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE (2006). 
 26. I discuss some evidence related to this point in David Fagundes, Buying Happiness: Property, 
Acquisition, and Subjective Well-Being, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1851 (2017); see infra notes 57–60. 
 27. See, e.g., Elizabeth W. Dunn et al., Spending Money on Others Promotes Happiness,  
319 SCIENCE 1687, 1687–88 (2008); see also infra Part II.B (exploring the relationship between 
one’s happiness and charity or inviting others to use one’s property). 
 28. For numerous cross-cultural studies, see infra note 62.  
 29. See, e.g., Lara B. Aknin et al., Does Social Connection Turn Good Deeds into Good 
Feelings?: On the Value of Putting the “Social” in Prosocial Spending 8–9 (2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/aknin%20dunn%20sandstrom 
%20norton_ecebf8d6-171f-484e-b4b5-1939bf2b5d8c.pdf. 
 30. See infra notes 81–88. 
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This Article explores the challenging question of how to incorporate the 
hedonic upsides of inclusion and dispossession into a body of law that has 
long been oriented around exclusion and possession. It may seem that the 
answer is to deemphasize owners’ rights,31 but hedonics evidence suggests that 
simply taking away property rights would fail to increase owners’ subjective 
well-being.32 This Article considers three specific contemporary topics in 
property relevant to inclusion or dispossession—the sharing economy, tax 
deductions for charitable donations, and property minimalism—and 
examines different kinds of “choice architecture” that promise to optimize 
their hedonic upsides.33 This analysis shows how property law can focus on 
inclusion and dispossession (the antitheses of exclusion and possession) in a 
way that increases social well-being while still respecting freedom of 
ownership. In so doing, this Article challenges the normative appeal of the 
two notions—exclusion and possession—that lie at the center of property 
while offering a way forward that preserves rather than tears down the notion 
of private property. 
This Article navigates the under-examined territory of inclusion and 
dispossession in four steps. Part I provides a brief overview of hedonics and 
explains why this evidence provides the best basis for making judgments about 
optimal policy choices in a utilitarian welfarist framework. Part II then 
outlines the surprising results of numerous hedonics studies about property, 
which suggest that inclusion and dispossession represent the best strategies 
for owners to maximize their subjective well-being. The subsequent three 
Parts provide concrete illustrations of this latter point. Part III turns to a 
leading inclusion approach to property—the sharing economy—and then 
shows how it enhances well-being in unappreciated ways and what law can do 
to facilitate this dynamic. Part IV considers a chief means by which law seeks 
to encourage voluntary dispossession of property—the charitable donation 
tax deduction—and shows both why present approaches are suboptimal and 
how we might remedy them. Part V analyzes a new dispossessive trend—
minimalist approaches to real and chattel property—and outlines the 
counterintuitive reasons that getting rid of property can make us happier, and 
 
 31. This notion is immanent, if not explicitly stated, in the work of progressive property 
scholars. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 983 (2009) (arguing that progressive property 
theorists “advocat[e] removing any presumption in favor of owners’ exclusion rights”). But cf. 
Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063, 1066 (2009) 
(rejecting the notion that progressive property is inconsistent with strong owners’ rights). 
 32. The reason, explained in much more detail infra Part II.B, is that the evidence indicates 
that only volitional inclusive or dispossessive uses of one’s property increase subjective well-being. 
See Netta Weinstein & Richard M. Ryan, When Helping Helps: Autonomous Motivation for Prosocial 
Behavior and Its Influence on Well-Being for the Helper and Recipient, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 222, 240 (2010); infra Part II.B. 
 33. See generally Eric J. Johnson et al., Beyond Nudges: Tools of a Choice Architecture, 23 
MARKETING LETTERS 487 (2012) (discussing choice architecture and its applications). 
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how law can do better to encourage this trend. Finally, the Conclusion reflects 
on what it would mean to incorporate the inclusion and dispossession into 
the edifice of private property, showing that these notions do not require us 
to abandon the institution of ownership but rather point toward a superior 
way to understand and govern it.  
II. THE HEDONIC UPSIDES OF INCLUSION AND DISPOSSESSION 
Few would disagree with the claim that governments should pass laws that 
make affected citizens better off. But what does it mean to increase societal 
well-being? The most common proxy is monetary wealth, hence the 
predominance of Gross Domestic Product as an overall measure of nations’ 
well-being. Such proxies may no longer be necessary in light of recent 
advances in the nascent field of hedonics. These advances allow scholars to 
measure directly how much a given activity or event increases or decreases an 
individual’s subjective well-being. This research has generated some 
surprising new insights into what does—and does not—make us happier. 
Nowhere is this truer than in the context of property, where happiness studies 
have revealed a weak relationship between possession or exclusion and 
subjective well-being. These new insights suggest that what increases our 
happiness is just the opposite: inclusive and dispossessive property strategies. 
This Part discusses hedonics first in general terms, focusing on its theoretical 
and empirical underpinnings as well as why it provides the best approach to 
measuring social welfare. It then catalogues a series of findings about the 
counterintuitive relationship between happiness and ownership.  
A. HAPPINESS & THE LAW: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
“Happiness,” legal philosopher Matthew Adler recently observed, “is all 
the rage.”34 This is certainly true with respect to popular culture, where there 
appears to be a generalized obsession with what makes us happy and how to 
be happier. Modern bookstores are cluttered with authors giving advice on 
how to increase happiness.35 This cultural trend has twinned with a recent 
efflorescence in the scientific study of happiness—a field specialists call 
“hedonics”—that empirically examines what external events and individual 
 
 34. Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: What’s the Use?, 62 DUKE L.J. 1509, 
1511 (2013). 
 35. Familiar examples include DALAI LAMA ET AL., THE BOOK OF JOY: LASTING HAPPINESS IN 
A CHANGING WORLD (2016); MOOREA SEAL, 52 LISTS FOR HAPPINESS: WEEKLY JOURNALING 
INSPIRATION FOR POSITIVITY, BALANCE, AND JOY (2016). Ironically, a conscious focus on making 
oneself happier may be counterproductive, since active attempts to raise one’s own happiness 
actually tend to reduce it—a relationship known as the “happiness paradox.” This may explain 
why authors report that their strenuous attempts to raise their own happiness have typically fallen 
short. See generally GRETCHEN RUBIN, THE HAPPINESS PROJECT (2012) (recounting the author’s 
year-long failed attempt to find happiness). 
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qualities cause people higher or lower affective states.36 The results of the new 
hedonics research have been enormously influential, including, as Adler’s 
remark suggests, as a tool for legal analysis.37 Yet what does “happiness” mean 
in this context? And how can something that ineffable be measured? 
Hedonics literature embraces two competing definitions of well-being. 
The first equates happiness with psychological affect. Per this definition, we 
are better off when we feel good and less well off when we feel bad. This kind 
of happiness—“affective” or “moment by moment” happiness—is studied via 
a technique known as the experience sampling method (“ESM”).38 ESM 
studies ask subjects to indicate their affect during randomly chosen moments 
on a Likert scale, where 1 indicates misery, 7 indicates ecstasy, and 4 indicates 
indifference. These responses are then connected with subjects’ reported 
activities to identify relationships between one’s activities and one’s affective 
state.39 The second widely used approach defines happiness as having a 
positive overall assessment of one’s life upon reflection.40 Scholars investigate 
this kind of subjective well-being using surveys that ask respondents to think 
about their life overall, and then rate how satisfied they feel with it—hence 
the term used to describe this kind of happiness, “life satisfaction.”41 The 
difference may be captured by contrasting someone who feels happy in a 
given moment watching television (high affective happiness), but who upon 
 
 36. See generally DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006) (detailing a fascinating 
and highly readable general overview on the scholarly study of happiness). 
 37. For two leading explorations of the connection between happiness and law, see 
generally BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 23 (arguing that happiness analysis provides the optimal 
framework for evaluating public policy), and LAW AND HAPPINESS (Eric A. Posner & Cass R. 
Sunstein eds., 2010) (collecting essays from leading legal academics on the merits and drawbacks 
of happiness analysis). 
 38. See Peter H. Huang, Authentic Happiness, Self-Knowledge and Legal Policy, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI.  
& TECH. 755, 761 (2008) (describing ESM as the “gold standard” of measuring affective happiness). 
 39. Earlier versions of ESM research asked subjects to note down in a journal their level of 
happiness at random times throughout the day. BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 23, at 17 (describing 
how Likert scales work). More recently, cellphone applications have become a leading means of 
gathering this data. Id. at 11–12 (describing ESM technology); EmotionSense App Measures Smartphone 
Users’ Happiness, FAST CO. (May 8, 2013), https://www.fastcompany.com/3009456/emotionsense-
app-measures-smartphone-users-happiness. For an overview of ESM and an explanation of the 
method’s reliability, see JOEL M. HEKTNER ET AL., EXPERIENCE SAMPLING METHOD: MEASURING THE 
QUALITY OF EVERYDAY LIFE (2007). 
 40. See Deirdre N. McCloskey, Happyism, NEW REPUBLIC (June 7, 2012), https://new 
republic.com/article/103952/happyism-deirdre-mccloskey-economics-happiness (“Pleasure is a 
brain wave right now. Happiness is a good story of your life.”). 
 41. Numerous leading assessments of aggregate happiness use the life satisfaction measure, 
such as the Eurobarometer and the Gallup World Poll. It is also prevalent, though far from 
predominant, in academic studies of hedonics. See, e.g., Wendy Johnson & Robert F. Krueger, 
How Money Buys Happiness: Genetic and Environmental Processes Linking Finances and Life Satisfaction, 
90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 680, 680–81 (2006) (using life satisfaction measures to 
analyze the relationship between income and happiness). 
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reflection would report dissatisfaction with their life as a couch potato (low 
life satisfaction).42  
The notion of measuring happiness empirically has met with 
understandable skepticism, given the counterintuitive notion of using 
empirical methods to measure something so ephemeral. But due to this 
outsized skepticism, happiness studies have been subjected to, and passed, an 
inordinate number of tests of both reliability and validity. In terms of 
reliability, the same subjects are generally tested and re-tested regarding the 
same subject matter several times, and they tend to report the same results.43 
And in terms of validity, self-reports of happiness tend to correlate with 
objective indicia of high affect, such as frequent smiling, smiling with the eyes, 
sleep quality, observations by third parties, and good health.44 In fact, 
neuropsychologists have used EEGs to show that self-reports of affective 
happiness tend to match with the frontal-lobe areas of the brain on which 
those responses typically register (right side for negative affect, left side for 
positive ones).45 
But even if hedonics research bears the indicia of reliable empirical work, 
what does it have to do with law? The short answer is: just about everything. 
At least from a utilitarian perspective, the purpose of passing any law is to 
make those affected by it better off. If we could predict that even the best-
intentioned statute was only going to result in making everyone miserable, it 
would be hard to justify its passage.46 Without evidence of a given policy’s 
impact on social well-being, however, it is difficult to make this assessment. 
 
 42. The same example could work in reverse: Consider someone who sincerely believes the 
moral thing to do is serve the poor, but who also hates working in soup kitchens. They would 
likely report very low affective happiness during the portions of their life spent ladling out 
chicken noodle to the less fortunate, but would probably indicate high life satisfaction due to a 
sense of having devoted their life to an important cause. But for the purposes of this Article, this 
distinction is less important because the research showing that sharing or giving away property 
makes people happier uses both measures of subjective well-being, and indeed many hedonics 
scholars have suggested that the best approach is to use both affective and life satisfaction 
measures to get the richest sense of respondents’ happiness. See Daniel Kahneman & Jason Riis, 
Living, and Thinking About It: Two Perspectives on Life, in THE SCIENCE OF WELL-BEING 285, 287–88 
(Felicia A. Huppert et al. eds., 2005). 
 43. See BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 23, at 13 (discussing reliability of hedonics studies). 
 44. Id. at 13–14 (discussing validity of hedonics studies). 
 45. See Richard J. Davidson, Affective Style, Psychopatholgy, and Resilience: Brain Mechanisms and 
Plasticity, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1196, 1202 (2000); Richard J. Davidson et al., Emotion, Plasticity, 
Context, and Regulation: Perspectives from Affective Neuroscience, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 890, 899–900 (2000). 
 46. This is true, at least, from a utilitarian perspective where the goal of any change in law 
is to cause an aggregate increase in social welfare. Other perspectives that look to deontological 
or rights-based considerations may not be as susceptible to a happiness analysis. That said, there 
is evidence about the effect of some distributional policies on happiness, such as the finding that 
higher taxes correlate with increased happiness. This work suggests that higher-taxation states 
tend to spend revenue on public goods such as quality transportation, health care, aesthetics and 
recreational opportunities, all of which make people happier. WORLD HAPPINESS REPORT 2017, 
(John Helliwell et al. eds, 2017), http://worldhappiness.report/ed/2017. 
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Jeremy Bentham’s original version of utilitarianism used subjective well-being 
as his standard for welfare in articulating his cornerstone theory of 
utilitarianism.47 But while he argued that states should seek to pass laws that 
led to the “greatest happiness” (i.e., the highest net increase in subjective well-
being), Bentham’s project was dogged by the lack of any reliable method by 
which to evaluate the net subjective well-being created by public policy.48 The 
emergence of a body of research that empirically measures the effect of policy 
on well-being has enabled the kind net welfare analysis that Bentham pined 
for but was unavailable in his day.  
Subjective well-being is not growing in influence as a criterion only within 
the academy. A number of world leaders, including Former French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, Former British Prime Minister David Cameron, and Former 
President Barack Obama have all advocated the use of happiness studies as a 
criterion for evaluating public policy.49 The United Nations General Assembly 
has embraced this approach as well.50 Bhutan has scrapped gross domestic 
product in favor of gross national happiness to measure national welfare.51 
Legal scholars have also used empirical insights on happiness to make a 
number of novel and important points about the law. Bronsteen, Buccafusco 
and Masur have shown that protracted civil litigation may not be as bad as 
generally believed, since it may give plaintiffs a chance to adapt to their 
injuries and accept a settlement that more accurately reflects the actual costs 
of their injury.52 These authors have also explored the implications of 
hedonics to the criminal law setting with the concerning result that short 
sentences may punish lightweight offenders disproportionately because the 
subjective costs of imprisonment are felt most keenly at the outset of a 
sentence, and diminish substantially thereafter.53 Bagenstos and Schlanger 
have shown that juries tend to make affective forecasting errors when 
assessing the damages experienced by disabled plaintiffs, resulting in inflated 
 
 47. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, at ccv 
(1789). 
 48. See generally David Colander, Edgeworth’s Hedonimeter and the Quest to Measure Utility, 21 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 215 (2007) (discussing the difficulty of finding an objective metric to measure 
subjective well-being). 
 49. See Elizabeth Kolbert, Everybody Have Fun: What Can Policymakers Learn from Happiness 
Research?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 22, 2010), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/03/22/ 
everybody-have-fun. The United Kingdom has begun to regularly monitor and publish statistics 
related to well-being. See OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT., MEASURING NATIONAL WELL-BEING: LIFE IN THE 
UK (2017), https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/articles/ 
measuringnationalwellbeing/apr2017. 
 50. Happiness Should Have Greater Role in Development Policy—UN Member States, UN NEWS (July 19, 
2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39084. 
 51. Adler, supra note 34, at 1516–17 (discussing Bhutan’s GDH approach). 
 52. John Bronsteen et al., Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1516, 1537–39 (2008). 
 53. John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1046–49 (2009). 
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judgments.54 Griffith argued that the weak relationship between wealth and 
subjective well-being supplies a convincing argument in favor of progressive 
tax policy.55 And Huang suggested that securities regulators can and should 
take into account investors’ and others’ affect and happiness when crafting 
financial regulations.56 For all these reasons, the emergence of reliable 
empirical measures of net social subjective well-being has opened up new 
vistas in evaluating both public policy and legal rules. 
B. INCLUSION, DISPOSSESSION, AND HAPPINESS 
The area of law in which the new hedonics research has the most salience, 
though, may be property. An increasing volume of happiness research 
appears to show that the longstanding assumption that getting and keeping 
property makes us better off is deeply flawed. One valence of this literature 
shows that acquisition of property does not necessarily increase subjective 
well-being. While debate on this point remains fraught, there is at best a weak 
positive relationship between increased income and one’s affective well-being 
after one reaches a threshold where one’s basic necessities are met.57 With 
respect to physical property, a number of studies show that buying homes or 
luxury goods does not lead to appreciably higher subjective well-being 
whether measured by affect or life satisfaction.58 There is a growing body of 
evidence that purchasing opulent homes and fancy cars can reduce 
 
 54. Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and 
Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 769–73 (2007). 
 55. Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1363, 1365 (2004). 
 56. Peter H. Huang, How Do Securities Laws Influence Affect, Happiness, & Trust?, 3 J. BUS.  
& TECH. L. 257, 259–61 (2008). 
 57. This surprising non-relationship is known colloquially as the “Easterlin paradox.” See 
generally Richard A. Easterlin, Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence, 
in NATIONS AND HOUSEHOLDS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MOSES ABRAMOVITZ 
89 (Paul A. David & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1974). Many scholars have followed it up with other 
studies looking at the relationship between wealth and subjective well-being. For a summary of 
this work, see LAYARD, supra note 25, at 41–54 (citing numerous studies for the proposition that 
increased income has a negligible effect on subjective well-being after a subsistence point). The 
leading contemporary skeptics of the Easterlin paradox are economists Justin Wolfers and Betsey 
Stevenson. Their findings, though, have at best a small effect size and look only at global, not 
moment-by-moment happiness. See Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Economic Growth and 
Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 
Spring 2008, at 1–4. 
 58. See, e.g., Norbert Schwarz & Jing Xu, Why Don’t We Learn from Poor Choices? The Consistency of 
Expectations, Choice, and Memory Clouds the Lessons of Experience, 21 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 142,  
143–44 (2011) (showing that buyers of high-end luxury goods ended up with the same level of 
subjective well-being as those who bought standard equivalent goods); Grace Wong Bucchianeri, 
The American Dream or the American Delusion? The Private and External Benefits of 
Homeownership for Women 18–22 (Apr. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1877163 (using both moment-by-moment and 
global measures to show that homeowners exhibit about the same level of happiness as similarly 
situated renters). 
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happiness. The thrill of a newly acquired good wears off quickly thanks to a 
process known as “hedonic adaptation,” and purchasers are often left with 
happiness-diminishing debt loads, soul-crushing commutes, and buyer’s 
remorse.59  
I summarized these findings and explored their implications for law in 
much more detail in earlier work. This happiness research implied a fairly 
straightforward recommendation: Individuals should acquire property only 
sparingly, and the state should not unthinkingly promote acquisition. That 
work, though, intentionally left aside a distinct line of happiness research 
about the use of property that raised even harder legal questions for owners 
and the state alike. If getting more property does not make us happier, then 
where does that leave those who are already owners? If exercising the right to 
acquire property does not make us happier, how might exercising the right 
to use counterbalance this? Here, the answers indicated by research are even 
more counterintuitive. The short answer appears to be the dead opposite of 
what law and culture suggest: Property makes us happiest not when we 
maximize its exclusion and possession for ourselves, but when we share it with 
others, donate it to help those in need, or even just give it away entirely. 
First, consider charity. Multi-billionaires like Bill Gates and Warren 
Buffett appear proudest not of the work that built their wealth, but of the 
large-scale charitable donations they have made with their fortunes.60 
Hedonics evidence suggests that this outcome is not limited to the obscenely 
rich. One of the most robust findings in the study of hedonics is that people 
who report giving more to charity also report higher subjective well-being 
(both in terms of affective happiness and life satisfaction).61 This result is not 
limited to the West or to the wealthy. Research has found that there is a strong 
relationship between charitable giving and happiness in countries as different 
as Canada and Uganda.62 Even small donations can generate boosts in well-
 
 59. See Fagundes, supra note 26, at 1869–79 (summarizing research supporting the 
conclusion that acquisition tends to reduce happiness). 
 60. Buffett, for example, recently announced that he was giving away 99% of his wealth  
upon his death, and that he “couldn’t be happier with that decision.” Warren Buffett,  
My Philanthrophic Pledge, FORTUNE (June 16, 2010, 8:06 AM), http://archive.fortune.com/ 
2010/06/15/news/newsmakers/Warren_Buffett_Pledge_Letter.fortune/index.htm. 
 61. See ELIZABETH DUNN & MICHAEL NORTON, HAPPY MONEY: THE SCIENCE OF HAPPIER 
SPENDING 113 (2013) (“Across the 136 countries studied . . . donating to charity had a similar 
relationship to happiness as doubling household income.”). 
 62. The authors of the major cross-cultural study on this topic concluded that their 
“findings suggest that the reward experienced from helping others may be deeply ingrained in 
human nature, emerging in diverse cultural and economic contexts.” Lara B. Aknin et al., 
Prosocial Spending and Well-Being: Cross-Cultural Evidence for a Psychological Universal, 104 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 635, 635 (2013) [hereinafter Aknin et al., Prosocial Spending]. The 
survey data they observed from 136 countries indicated that prosocial spending is strongly 
correlated with higher happiness. The authors also conducted their own studies showing that this 
effect was causal, and that it held true in both wealthy Western countries (Canada) and poorer 
non-Western ones (South Africa). Id. (“This research provides the first support for a possible 
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being.63 And while one might reasonably raise a correlation/causation 
objection to these findings, charitable donation does appear to predict and 
not just be associated with subjective well-being, as demonstrated by a number 
of different longitudinal studies.64 Perhaps most surprising, charitable 
donation can make people feel wealthier even as it reduces their actual 
wealth.65 The reason appears to be that acting magnanimously makes people 
feel not only charitable, but powerful, and reminds them of their wealth status 
in the world relative to the more needy.66 
Not all giving, though, is created equal from a happiness perspective. 
One requirement is that you have to mean it. That is, the positive relationship 
between charity and happiness is largely a side effect of sincere generosity; 
when people are motivated to give because they feel coerced to do so, the 
hedonic upsides of prosocial giving tend to evaporate.67 Second, charitable 
 
psychological universal: Human beings around the world derive emotional benefits from using 
their financial resources to help others (prosocial spending).”); see Elizabeth W. Dunn et al., 
Prosocial Spending and Happiness: Using Money to Benefit Others Pays Off, 23 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 41, 43–45 (2014) (summarizing numerous studies showing that the clear 
consensus of the evidence indicates that spending prosocially is strongly related to increased 
happiness); see also DUNN & NORTON, supra note 61, at 106–33 (discussing the relationship 
between giving and happiness). This effect is cross-cutting not only with respect to geography, 
culture, and wealth, but even age. A study of children found that toddlers exhibited more 
external signs of affective happiness when they engaged in “costly giving” (giving that deprived 
them of something) than when they kept or used things for themselves. Lara B. Aknin et al., 
Giving Leads to Happiness in Young Children, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 3 (2012). Some scholars have argued 
that the causation is otherwise, and that happiness leads to generosity. Silke Boenigk & Marcel 
Lee Mayr, The Happiness of Giving: Evidence from the German Socioeconomic Panel That Happier People 
Are More Generous, 17 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 1825, 1830 (2016). But there is no reason that the 
causation needs to run in only one direction; it could well be the case that happier people are 
more generous, and also that generous people become happier. It also bears noting that the 
study that came to this conclusion used life satisfaction as its benchmark for happiness rather 
than the more meaningful standard of affect. Id. at 1827. 
 63. See DUNN & NORTON, supra note 61, at 107 (“New research shows that spending even 
small amounts of money on others can make a difference for our own happiness.”); Lalin Anik 
et al., Prosocial Bonuses Increase Employee Satisfaction and Team Performance, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 5 (2013) 
(showing that enabling workers to give even small prosocial bonuses to other workers increased 
their happiness more than simply giving those workers self-oriented bonuses).  
 64. Aknin et al., Prosocial Spending, supra note 62, at 646; Elizabeth W. Dunn et al., Spending 
Money on Others Promotes Happiness, 319 SCIENCE 1687, 1687–88 (2008) (illustrating this point by 
citing several studies, including findings that prosocial spending predicted happiness 
longitudinally and that participants who were randomly assigned to spend money on others 
experienced greater affective happiness than those who spent it on themselves).  
 65. Zoë Chance & Michael I. Norton, I Give, Therefore I Have: Giving and  
Subjective Wealth 3 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://faculty.som.yale.edu/zoechance/ 
documents/zchancepaper1-jcr2ndround-givingandsubjectivewealth.pdf (cataloguing five studies 
showing that giving money away made people feel subjectively wealthier while also increasing their 
affective well-being). 
 66. Id. at 5–6.  
 67. Weinstein & Ryan, supra note 32, at 240 (“When individuals volitionally help, they 
experience greater autonomy, relatedness, and competence; need satisfactions that in turn 
appear to enhance the helper’s sense of well-being. These benefits of volition also appear to 
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giving increases subjective well-being particularly where it leads to a personal 
connection with the recipient of the gift. This links two activities that are both 
strongly related to happiness: giving and social connection.68 A donation to 
any identifiable recipient appears to enhance its hedonic impact, but those 
impacts appear to be somewhat stronger for members of one’s local 
community and/or for those with whom one has strong social ties (e.g., 
family, close friends). Third, giving generates the most happiness when it 
produces an identifiable impact, likely because it allows the giver to observe 
and experience in a concrete way the effect of their good deed.69 This means 
that targeted donations to individuals or small groups (such as 
DonorsChoose.org, which allows people to give specific needed goods to 
specific classrooms of children in need of them) may do more to enhance 
donors’ subjective well-being than monetary donations to broad-based 
charities (such as UNICEF, which more diffusely helps with a number of 
different broad-based initiatives against third-world hunger).  
Another method of sharing property is not to give it away entirely to those 
in need, but to invite others to use it. Here, too, studies indicate that this form 
of sharing property generates much higher well-being than holding on to our 
things for ourselves alone. The Law may enable owners to engage in absolute 
exclusion,70 and popular culture may embrace a greed-is-good mentality,71 but 
evidence appears to show that social connection rather than maximizing 
wealth is the best strategy for increasing our subjective well-being. If the most 
robust finding in this literature is that prosocial giving enhances happiness, 
likely the second most robust is that having and expanding one’s network of 
social connections also does wonders for one’s subjective well-being.72 “We 
 
radiate to the recipients of help . . . .”). Other work on neural responsiveness, though, confirms 
that even mandatory giving can generate affective well-being, though notably less than voluntary 
giving does. See William T. Harbaugh et al., Neural Responses to Taxation and Voluntary Giving Reveal 
Motives for Charitable Donations, 316 SCIENCE 1622, 1622 (2007). 
 68. Aknin et al., supra note 29, at 2 (showing that people exhibited more affective happiness 
when they gave charitable donations in a way that facilitated social connection with the recipient). 
 69. Lara B. Aknin et al., Making a Difference Matters: Impact Unlocks the Emotional Benefits of 
Prosocial Spending, 88 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 90, 92 (2013); Melanie Rudd et al., Getting the Most 
out of Giving: Concretely Framing a Prosocial Goal Maximizes Happiness, 54 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 11, 14 (2014) (finding that respondents reported more affective happiness after 
contemplating a specific prosocial goal like increasing local recycling than an abstract one like 
saving the environment). 
 70. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 1835, 1841–42 (2006) (discussing the “hermit’s right” as an extreme iteration of the right 
to exclude). 
 71. Films like Wall Street may purport to be morality tales about the downfalls of avarice, but 
far more people remember Gordon Gekko’s “greed is good” dictum than the film’s protagonist 
eventually being tearfully arrested for insider trading. 
 72. See, e.g., Alan B. Krueger, Are We Having More Fun Yet? Categorizing and Evaluating Changes in 
Time Allocation, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 193 (2007) (finding that of all ranked 
activities, people reported the highest affective well-being during time spent with family and friends).  
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need other people, and we need to be needed,” happiness scholar Richard 
Layard observed; “[i]ncreasingly, research confirms the dominating 
importance of love.”73 And while the relationship between happiness and 
sociality is strongest with respect to strong ties like family and close friends, 
research indicates that even weak ties can significantly boost our subjective 
well-being.74 The general connection between happiness and rich social 
connection is also robust across nations and socio-economic strata,75 having 
been observed among poorer populations worldwide,76 and also among 
traditionally disadvantaged groups.77 One interesting study found that 
Benedictine nuns in isolated monasteries reported extremely high levels of 
life satisfaction, thanks in large part to their living in a close-knit, mutually 
respectful community.78 
By contrast, studies have also shown that materialism—the attitude that 
one’s own wealth maximization matters more than anything else, including 
social connections—tends to reduce one’s happiness in large part because of 
its deleterious effects on one’s social networks. One study found that as people 
were reminded of their own wealth, they tended to emphasize their 
 
 73. LAYARD, supra note 25, at 66; see also DANIEL M. HAYBRON, THE PURSUIT OF UNHAPPINESS: 
THE ELUSIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF WELL-BEING (2008) (summarizing research showing that happiness 
seems to come primarily from good social relationships). See generally DUNN & NORTON, supra 
note 61 (assessing the consensus of research and finding that, regardless of whether money is 
involved, the number one thing that makes people happy is spending time with loved ones). 
 74. See Gillian M. Sandstrom & Elizabeth W. Dunn, Social Interactions and Well-Being: The 
Surprising Power of Weak Ties, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 910, 920 (2014) (summarizing 
research showing that weak ties are positively related to social and economic well-being as well, 
which in turn “suggest[s] that we should not underestimate the value of our acquaintances—
interactions with weak ties are related to our subjective well-being and feelings of belonging”). 
 75. See generally Tanya Diaz & Ngoc H. Bui, Subjective Well-Being in Mexican and Mexican 
American Women: The Role of Acculturation, Ethnic Identity, Gender Roles, and Perceived Social Support, 
18 J. HAPPINESS STUD. (forthcoming 2018) (finding the same result in populations of Latinas in 
Mexico and the U.S.); Andrés Rodríguez-Pose & Viola von Berlepsch, Social Capital and Individual 
Happiness in Europe, 15 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 357, 372 (2014) (identifying strong relationship 
between social connection and happiness in nations across Western Europe); Hiromi Taniguchi, 
Interpersonal Mattering in Friendship as a Predictor of Happiness in Japan: The Case of Tokyoites, 16 J. 
HAPPINESS STUD. 1475, 1477 (2015) (study of Tokyoites finding that the perception of having a 
rich social network is strongly associated with happiness).  
 76. See Victoria Reyes-García et al., Subjective Wellbeing and Income: Empirical Patterns in the 
Rural Developing World, 17 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 773, 786–87 (2016) (finding that income is weakly 
related to happiness while social connection is strongly related to happiness among the rural 
poor in Asia, Africa, and Latin America). 
 77. See Ann W. Nguyen et al., Social Support from Family and Friends and Subjective Well-Being of 
Older African-Americans, 17 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 959 (2016) (finding family contact highly 
correlated with life satisfaction among older African-Americans). See generally Juan Battle & Alfred 
DeFreece, The Impact of Community Involvement, Religion, and Spirituality on Happiness and Health 
Among a National Sample of Black Lesbians, 2 WOMEN, GENDER, & FAMILIES COLOR 1 (2014) (finding 
a strong relationship between social connection and happiness among Black lesbians). 
 78. Tomáš Janotík, Empirical Analysis of Life Satisfaction in Female Benedictine Monasteries in 
Germany, 67 REVUE ÉCONOMIQUE 143, 162 (2016). 
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separateness from others, to be less helpful toward others, and to express 
preferences for solitude.79 A related study found that invoking materialist 
mindsets in respondents caused them to think about the world in terms of 
money, thereby leading them to want to work more and socialize less—a 
strategy effective for increasing income but costly for increasing happiness.80 
The relationship between sharing and happiness with respect to social 
connection thus works in two connected ways. Using one’s property to 
enhance social connections tends to increase happiness not only by virtue of 
increasing one’s own sense of connection with strong and weak ties alike, but 
also because it creates a mindset in which people are more important than 
money, thereby generating a feedback loop that incentivizes us to use our 
property in the various kinds of prosocial ways most likely to increase our 
happiness.  
Another simple way to increase happiness is to dispose of property. While 
law protects possession and society implicitly rewards those who amass and 
keep stuff (not to mention the growing fascination with “hoarders” who 
compulsively covet their possessions), this strategy may be toxic to one’s 
happiness. Despite the negative associations with the term “downsizing,”81 the 
growing trend toward simplicity reflected in a growing number of tiny houses 
and micro-housing developments, a proclivity toward sharing, and a 
minimalist approach to life may represent a more effective path toward higher 
subjective well-being. A number of studies have found that acquisition of 
property does not increase—and may even decrease—our subjective well-
being. Summarizing research in Germany and the United States, scholars 
recently observed that “there is almost no evidence that buying a home—or a 
newer, nicer home—increases happiness.”82 The same holds true for chattel 
 
 79. See generally Kathleen D. Vohs et al., The Psychological Consequences of Money, 314 SCIENCE 
1154, 1156 (2006) (concluding that increased awareness of money tends to foment a mindset of 
independence in which people want to be independent from others and thereby reject social 
connectedness). 
 80. Cassie Mogilner, The Pursuit of Happiness: Time, Money and Social Connection, 21 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 1348, 1352 (2010) (“Focusing on money motivates one to work more, which . . . (although 
productive) translate into greater happiness.”). 
 81. “Downsizing” is, after all, often a euphemism for major corporate layoffs. Adrian 
Wilkinson, Downsizing, Rightsizing, or Dumbsizing? Quality, Human Resources, and the Management of 
Sustainability, 16 TOTAL QUALITY MGMT. & BUS. EXCELLENCE 1079, 1080 (2005) (defining 
“downsizing” as “the conscious use of permanent personnel reductions” as a means of enhancing 
corporate performance). 
 82. DUNN & NORTON, supra note 61, at 2. See Naoki Nakazato et al., Effect of Changes in Living 
Conditions on Well-Being: A Prospective Top–Down Bottom–-Up Model, 100 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 115, 
129 (2011) (reporting that German respondents did not indicate any greater overall life 
satisfaction after purchasing either their first home or a newer, nicer home); Bucchianeri, supra 
note 58, at 11 (using both life satisfaction and affective happiness measures to show that 
homeowners in Ohio reported no greater subjective well-being than similarly situated renters). 
In a related study, while college first-year students predicted that the quality of their upper-class 
housing assignments would have huge impacts on their happiness, studies of those same students 
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property, particularly luxury goods like fancy cars and oversized TVs. While 
people predict that they will be happier with such items, post-purchase surveys 
reveal that buying more expensive high-end goods does not increase 
subjective well-being any more than acquiring the functional, run-of-the-mill 
version of the same thing.83 
Why doesn’t getting stuff, and in particular, getting nicer, fancier stuff 
make us happier? The reasons are several. The leading one is hedonic 
adaptation. This is the familiar process by which we grow used to possessions, 
so that while a big new home or a flashy shirt might bring us a spike of 
subjective well-being, that feeling fades quickly, leaving us conscious mainly 
of the downsides of our property.84 These downsides often generate more 
negative affect than the purchase brought. Chief among these is debt, which 
haunts people long after they have hedonically adapted to the novelty of the 
McMansion or Mercedes they went into shock to buy.85 Large-scale purchases 
often require more attention and upkeep than their simpler counterparts, so 
that they reduce owners’ free time. This is salient for happiness because 
research has shown that “time affluence” is a much greater driver of subjective 
well-being than monetary affluence.86 Compulsive ownership also risks a 
vicious cycle researchers have termed the “hedonic treadmill,” whereby the 
fading thrill of one thing leads to a desire to recapture the feeling by acquiring 
even more possessions with increasingly fleeting effect. This decreasing 
marginal happiness is further evidenced by studies indicating that increasing 
wealth tends to make people both more materialistic (which is associated with 
decreased happiness),87 as well as a loss of the ability to savor both future 
purchases and life’s many small, free pleasures.88  
 
years later found that their happiness was unrelated to the quality of their housing (and driven 
much more by the quality of their social relationships). See Elizabeth W. Dunn et al., Location, 
Location, Location: The Misprediction of Satisfaction in Housing Lotteries, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1421, 1429 (2003). 
 83. See Schwarz & Xu, supra note 58, at 143–44. 
 84. For a good overview of hedonic adaptation, see Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, 
Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 302 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1999). 
 85. See DUNN & NORTON, supra note 61, at 95 (discussing the outsized hedonic costs of debt 
and observing that “what we owe is a bigger predictor of our happiness than what we make”).  
 86. Id. at 54–65 (discussing “time affluence” and its greater effect on subjective well-being than 
monetary affluence); see also Tim Kasser & Kennon M. Sheldon, Time Affluence as a Path Toward 
Personal Happiness and Ethical Business Practice: Empirical Evidence from Four Studies, 84 J. BUS. ETHICS 
243, 243–44 (2009) (describing how “time affluence” may benefit employee well-being). 
 87. SONJA LYUBOMIRSKY, THE MYTHS OF HAPPINESS 144 (2014) (summarizing research 
indicating that acquiring wealth makes us more conscious of and desirous for additional wealth). 
 88. Jordi Quoidbach et al., The Price of Abundance: How a Wealth of Experiences Impoverishes 
Savoring, 41 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 393, 400–02 (2015); Jordi Quoidbach et al., 
Money Giveth, Money Taketh Away: The Dual Effect of Wealth on Happiness, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 759, 761 
(2010) (“Thus, wealth may fail to deliver the happiness one might expect because of its 
detrimental consequences for savoring.”). 
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C. TOWARD INCLUSION AND DISPOSSESSION  
A quick glimpse at property in law or culture suggests that what matters 
is getting and having things. From Blackstone’s despotic dominion89 to Mr. 
Burns declaring that his solitary domain is “excellent,”90 selfish and nearly 
limitless acquisition seems to be what law protects and what culture glorifies. 
But does this focus on materialism actually make us better off? The emergent 
field of hedonics has allowed us to measure subjective well-being directly, and 
the evidence it has produced suggests that the answer is no, and that in fact 
just the opposite is true. Yet the emerging empirical reality of happiness’s 
relationship with inclusion and dispossession lies in stark tension with the 
law’s staunch policies of protecting and incentivizing the possession of 
property. Assuming the familiar premise that law seeks to make those it affects 
better off, radical rethinking of these policies appears in order. But what in 
particular should the state do if possession does not actually increase societal 
well-being? One plausible but inadvisable answer is to weaken traditional 
property crime protections like trespass or theft laws. These laws serve 
valuable functions in terms of enhancing overall societal well-being. For one 
thing, security in one’s possessions is a great source of psychological health, 
while a sense that one’s property lacks security against unauthorized 
incursions tends to decrease happiness.91 Moreover, all the evidence that 
dispossession of property increases subjective well-being refers to voluntary 
dispossession by owners themselves. These studies have nothing to say about 
forced dispossession by third parties or the state, and what evidence we have 
is consistent with the intuition that forced property losses reduce happiness 
significantly.92  
This is not to say that law should simply remain indifferent. The 
challenge becomes to implement strategies that encourage owners to engage 
in this conduct optimally while preserving the kind of freedom of ownership 
that is an essential prerequisite for happiness-increasing uses of property. The 
following three Parts explore different means by which the state may do this: 
 
 89. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 1. 
 90. See Kory Grow, Excellent, Smithers: Harry Shearer’s 10 Best ‘Simpsons’ Characters, ROLLING 
STONE (May 14, 2015), https://www.rollingstone.com/tv/lists/excellent-smithers-harry-shearers- 
10-best-simpsons-characters-20150514/montgomery-burns-20150514. 
 91. The most famous articulation of the psychic costs of state limitation of property rights 
is Michelman’s work on “demoralization costs.” Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 
(1967). Michelman’s foundational account focuses on two aspects of demoralization costs. One 
is the psychic costs inflicted on owners whose own property is divested from them by the state. 
The other is the “lost future production” resulting from other owners’ realization that they, too, 
might be dispossessed. Id. 
 92. See, e.g., Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation, in THE URBAN 
CONDITION: PEOPLE AND POLICY IN THE METROPOLIS 151, 151 (Leonard J. Duhl ed., 1963) 
(studying forced dislocation in Boston’s former West End and concluding that “forced 
dislocation from an urban slum is a highly disruptive and disturbing experience”). 
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by passing regulations favorable to the nascent sharing economy; by crafting 
charitable donation incentives to more efficiently encourage prosocial 
spending; and by facilitating the growing social trend toward reducing 
ownership of both real and chattel property. In each of these areas, the state 
can nudge people toward an approach to property that honors ownership 
while steering clear of possessive materialism, thereby increasing overall social 
well-being in the process.  
III. HAPPINESS, INCLUSION, AND THE SHARING ECONOMY 
A. PROPERTY, SHARING, AND REGULATION 
While the right to exclude predominates in theoretical debates about 
property, the most significant development in the actual use of property in 
the past decade has been an inclusion strategy: the sharing economy.93 The 
emergence of application-based, peer-to-peer platforms has allowed 
consumers to acquire services directly from providers instead of using a 
commercial intermediary. Need a ride someplace or a room for the night? It 
is no longer necessary to contact a cab company’s central dispatch to send 
one of their drivers, or to call around to see which hotels have free rooms. 
Apps like Uber and Lyft connect users directly with drivers immediately 
available in the area, while Airbnb and VRBO can connect consumers with 
locals who are eager to rent their place or even just a room. This phenomenon 
has not only made it easier for consumers to acquire services, but also for 
providers to enter markets. The people supplying rides or rooms are not 
professional drivers or hoteliers. Rather, they are often94 regular folks seeking 
to take advantage of excess capacity and using the platform-based sharing 
economy apps to avoid having it go to waste and making a few extra bucks. 
The sharing economy stretches widely enough that nearly every familiar or 
obscure service may be acquired on a peer-to-peer basis via dedicated online 
 
 93. Writers refer to this phenomenon in many ways: the platform economy, the gig 
economy, the access economy, and the person to person (“p2p”) economy, among others. This 
Article will use the term “sharing economy” for a couple of reasons: First, I think the term “sharing 
economy” is the primary way people refer to it; and second, my argument later is that whether 
these platforms enable actual sharing (i.e., gratuitous transfers) should matter for how we 
regulate them. That said, there are a profusion of other terms people have used for this 
phenomenon that strike me as equally plausible, such as the platform economy, the access 
economy, the gig economy, the p2p economy, and probably others. See Orly Lobel, The Law of the 
Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 88–89 (2016) (discussing the profusion of nomenclature for this 
economic trend). 
 94. There are some individuals participating in Uber or Airbnb that are professional drivers 
or hoteliers respectively. Sofia Ranchordás, On Sharing and Quasi-Sharing: The Tension Between 
Sharing-Economy Practices, Public Policy and Regulation, in THE SHARING ECONOMY: POSSIBILITIES, 
CHALLENGES, AND THE WAY FORWARD 38 (Pia A. Albinsson & B. Yasanthi Perera eds., forthcoming 
2018) (distinguishing between “sharing”, defined as individuals seeking to sell off excess capacity 
in their homes or cars, and “quasi-sharing”, defined as entities using app-based p2p means of 
engaging in traditional commerce). 
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platforms: a gourmet farm-to-table meal,95 a pet sitter,96 even someone to wait 
in line on your behalf for the latest Apple product (or anything else).97  
The emergence of the sharing economy poses difficult regulatory 
challenges. Most laws that could apply to the sharing economy—contracts 
rules, labor regulations, building codes—predate its emergence. Courts and 
scholars alike have struggled to determine whether sharing can fit into these 
extant regulatory schemes, or whether this new modality of commerce 
requires novel laws to govern it.98 Scholars concerned with the sharing 
economy debate whether it can and should be subject to traditional 
taxation,99 whether longstanding antidiscrimination principles can address 
the race bias issues that arise in a decentralized economy,100 and whether well-
established takings law invalidates restrictions on short-term rental 
restrictions proposed for housing-sharing platforms.101 Courts occupy 
themselves with similar questions, such as whether longstanding local taxicab 
regulations apply to ride-share services like Uber and Lyft.102 As the sharing 
economy continues to grow into a dominant means of economic exchange, 
 
 95. The Hartman Group, “Uber” Your Cooking: The Sharing Economy Comes to Your Kitchen, 
FORBES (May 13, 2015, 11:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/thehartmangroup/2015/05/ 
13/uber-your-cooking-the-sharing-economy-comes-to-your-kitchen. 
 96. Stephanie Miles, 5 Pet Sitting Marketplaces in the ‘Sharing Economy’, STREET FIGHT (Aug. 6, 
2014), http://streetfightmag.com/2014/08/06/5-pet-sitting-marketplaces-in-the-sharing-economy. 
 97. Wait in Line, TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/m/gen-help/waiting-in-line 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
 98. As Kellen Zale put it: 
[A] polarized debate has erupted between those who contend that the activities 
taking place within the sharing economy are so novel that no laws apply to those 
engaging in those activities, and those who argue that the sharing economy should 
be treated no differently than its analog counterparts, such as hotels and taxis.  
Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 503 (2016); see also Stephen R. Miller, First 
Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 149–50 (2016) (reviewing 
the application of current law to the sharing economy and concluding that sharing is sufficiently 
different than other forms of economic activity that it warrants a distinct response). 
 99. See generally Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989 
(2016) (exploring how goods and services of the sharing economy should be regulated in the 
context of taxation). 
 100. See generally Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race 
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271 (2017) (examining existing public 
accommodation laws and arguing that these laws must change to address discrimination in the 
platform economy). 
 101. See Jamila Jefferson-Jones, Airbnb and the Housing Segment of the Modern “Sharing Economy”: 
Are Short-Term Rental Restrictions an Unconstitutional Taking?, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 557, 560 
(2015) (considering whether short-term rental restrictions equate to “unconstitutional takings 
of private property without just compensation”). 
 102. See Mike Isaac & Noam Scheiber, Uber Settles Cases with Concessions, but Drivers Stay 
Freelancers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/technology/ 
uber-settles-cases-with-concessions-but-drivers-stay-freelancers.html (recounting the series of 
lawsuits that raised these issues and describing their varied outcomes).  
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law must make decisions about how to regulate it, and those choices will 
dictate the sharing economy’s future.103 
The legal literature that addresses the problem of regulating sharing has 
propounded a variety of possible solutions.104 Kellen Zale has highlighted the 
social costs of widespread activities that are individually costless but 
collectively harmful.105 Orly Lobel has argued that the disruptiveness of these 
new modalities of commerce is a feature, not a bug, of the regulation of novel 
markets. And Rashmi Dyal-Chand has posited that the sharing economy 
represents a novel kind of coordinated market that warrants radically 
different regulation than traditional capitalist systems.106 These normative 
takes on the sharing economy, and nearly all others like them, share a single 
feature in common: They analyze the sharing economy using the traditional 
tools of social-cost economics, looking primarily to incentive effects, market 
failures, and the optimal balance between regulation and free commerce.107 
B. SHARING AS HAPPINESS: FOUR EXAMPLES 
The approaches discussed in the previous Subpart have produced 
valuable insights about the sharing economy, and their methodology 
represents a plausible approach. The tools of traditional economics-inflected 
cost-benefit analysis indeed seem like a plausible way to think about regulating 
a new form of commerce. But focusing only on incentives or market failures 
misses much of what is distinctive about the sharing economy. The sharing 
economy is more than just a novel and efficient form of commercial 
exchange. Many who observe and participate in it extol the capacity of the 
sharing economy to create community, generate creativity, and reshape 
individuals’ relationship with property in ways that are not captured by the 
traditional paradigms used by contemporary scholarship.108 This is not merely 
 
 103. Lobel, supra note 93, at 90 (observing that we are “at an all-time high in regulatory 
permitting, licensing, and protection,” and that “[t]he battle over law in the platform is, 
therefore, both fundamentally conceptual and highly practical”). 
 104. This kind of debate is typical when new social trends challenge traditional legal 
categories. The rise of the internet is a classic example and led to a classic debate between Larry 
Lessig, who favored novel regulation, and Frank Easterbrook, who regarded the cyber as 
something law was perfectly capable of regulating using existing schemes. Compare Lawrence 
Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 501–03 (1999), 
with Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberlaw and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207–08. 
 105. See Kellen Zale, When Everything Is Small: The Regulatory Challenge of Scale in the Sharing 
Economy, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 949, 951–58 (2016). 
 106. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative Capitalist 
System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 243–50 (2015). 
 107. There are many variations, such as an emergent interest in the impact of the sharing 
economy on racial justice. See Leong & Belzer, supra note 100, at 1275–77. 
 108. See, e.g., Beth Buczynski, Sharing Is Good: Building a Sharing Economy & Community, 
INNERSELF, http://innerself.com/content/social-a-political/trends/8980-sharing-is-good-building-
a-sharing-economy.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2018) (remarking on the capacity of the sharing 
economy to encourage richer communities and more self-sufficient behavior); Natasha Singer, In 
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a descriptive point. These features of the sharing economy can in turn 
produce a significant amount of subjective well-being that has to be part of 
any accurate discussion of the social costs and benefits of this phenomenon. 
Indeed, one study found that eight in ten respondents reported that 
participating in the sharing economy made them happier.109 The ensuing 
discussion explains the nexus of happiness and sharing in terms of four 
factors: facilitating non-monetary swapping (“true” sharing); enabling 
individuals to interact with one another absent a corporate middleman 
(“disintermediation”); increasing participants’ subjective sense of their social 
network (“community-building”); and shifting from a focus on owning 
property to accessing it (“access over ownership”). 
1. True Sharing 
Nearly every academic discussion of the sharing economy includes 
someone’s observation that what we typically call “sharing” in this setting is 
anything but.110 That person whom you contacted via TaskRabbit to walk your 
dog, or the lady who offered to let you leave your car in her driveway on 
JustPark, are not doing these acts out of the goodness of their hearts. On the 
contrary, these are merely standard exchanges of money for services that 
happen to take place outside the context of traditional corporate 
intermediaries. That said, the oft-invoked distinction between “true” sharing 
and app-based commercial activity does represent a meaningful divide within 
the sharing economy.111 Some sites actually do enable what a layperson may 
think of as sharing.112 FreeCycle is an international network that allows people 
within communities to make things they do not need available to those who 
do need them, with the simultaneous goals of helping those without the 
 
the Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom and Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/technology/in-the-sharing-economy-workers-find-both- 
freedom-and-uncertainty.html (illustrating that the sharing economy brings workers a mixed bag of 
self-determination and unpredictability). In fairness, some of these values may be captured by more 
recent theoretical approaches, in particular the emergent progressive property school. For  
a good overview, see generally Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property,  
94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009). 
 109. See RACHEL GRIFFITHS, CO-OPERATIVES UK, THE GREAT SHARING ECONOMY: A REPORT 
INTO SHARING ACROSS THE UK 1 (2011), http://library.uniteddiversity.coop/Cooperatives/ 
The_great_sharing_economy.pdf. 
 110. I have never been to an academic paper presentation about a sharing-economy paper 
in which someone does not raise the point that much of what comprises the sharing economy is 
not what we colloquially understand to be sharing.  
 111. See Ranchordás, supra note 94, at 38–41 (distinguishing sharing and quasi-sharing to 
highlight this distinction).  
 112. The Master List of the Collaborative Economy: Rent and Trade Everything, JEREMIAH  
OWYANG (Feb. 24, 2013), http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2013/02/24/the-master-list-of-
the-collaborative-economy-rent-and-trade-everything (listing sharing economy entities and 
showing that true-sharing ones are a relative minority). 
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means to buy necessaries and reducing consumer waste.113 Gifteng is a similar, 
app-based program rooted in principles of reciprocity that encourage users 
to exchange unwanted items with others.114 France’s Zilok provides a platform 
where members of the same community can list objects they want to make 
available for others to use for free.115 Along similar lines, sites like 
CouchSurfing provide a way for those with a free room or even couch to let 
travelers in need of a place to crash do so without pay.  
These true-sharing projects are typically lumped in with the more well-
known commercial sites that represent the majority of sharing-economy sites, 
but hedonics shows why this distinction makes a major difference in terms of 
the social welfare generated by true sharing: True-sharing sites epitomize the 
kind of altruism that has been shown to produce an outsized degree of 
subjective well-being. As Part I illustrated, prosocial uses of property such as 
giving one’s things away to others appears to have a causal relationship with 
increased subjective well-being—that is, it actually makes us happier.  
Users of true-sharing sites anecdotally report just such a result. FreeCycle 
users report a “warm glow” from the acts of generosity facilitated by the site, 
which “wiped out their feelings of cynicism and replac[ed] them with a sense 
of moral inspiration.”116 Numerous Couchsurfing users report that happiness 
is a leading reason they participate in free home sharing.117 These outcomes 
are not surprising, given that the kind of altruism enabled by true-sharing 
platforms bears the specific features most likely to make people happier. They 
enable in-person connections, whether to the individuals to whom you donate 
things to using an online goods-sharing app or the traveler from abroad who 
sleeps on your couch and becomes a new friend. They also allow people to 
make a visible impact on the world. FreeCycle, for example, facilitates 
targeted acts of giving particular things to specified individuals in one’s local 
community rather than the kind of broad-based prosocial charitable spending 
that appears less causally related to increased happiness.  
 
 113. FREECYCLE, https://www.freecycle.org (last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
 114. GITHUB, https://github.com/Yatko/Gifteng (last visited Mar. 13, 2018); Peter Ha, 
Zilok Allows You to Rent Anything from Anyone, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 5, 2007), https://techcrunch. 
com/2007/11/05/zilok-allows-you-to-rent-anything-from-anyone. Ask and Give is an app that 
similarly allows members of the same local community to offer to give away (and to take from 
others) unneeded things. 
 115. See J. David Goodman, Learning to Share, Thanks to the Web, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/weekinreview/26goodman.html (discussing Zilok in 
the context of a number of U.S.-based free-rental sites, such as NeighborGoods and 
ShareSomeSugar, each of which operated for only about three years).  
 116. See generally ADAM GRANT, GIVE AND TAKE: WHY HELPING OTHERS DRIVES OUR SUCCESS 
(2013) (discussing the positive psychological effects of the altruism enabled by Freecyle). 
 117. See, e.g., Adam Hurst, COUCHSURFING, https://www.couchsurfing.com/people/muvy 
tikit (last visited Mar. 13, 2018) (One user declared on his Couchsurfing profile: “Our happiness 
is greatest when we contribute most to the happiness of others!”). 
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2. Disintermediation 
Even the many sharing-economy platforms that have no aspiration to 
encourage altruism may still enhance subjective well-being more than their 
traditional counterparts to the extent that they enable interactions without 
the involvement of corporate intermediaries that characterize standard 
commercial exchange. Consider an example. A professor is teaching a two-
month summer course at a British university in London. One option for 
accommodations is to stay at corporate housing provided by the university. 
Another is to find a place to stay on AirBNB or VRBO. The professor would 
likely look to traditional considerations like cost, location, and amenities in 
making this choice. But another distinction is that staying in corporate 
housing, a hotel, or any other traditional accommodation would likely not 
bring the professor into direct contact with the proprietors in the same way 
that using a person to person (“p2p”) rental platform would. The latter would 
at least require individualized interactions to negotiate a price and meet with 
the AirBNB proprietors, and could develop into a useful relationship where 
the proprietors helped the professor negotiate his way around a foreign 
country.118 This is the essence of disintermediation: The kind of p2p 
commercial exchange enabled by the sharing economy eliminates traditional 
middlemen and brings people closer together.119 
Many sharing economy sites have this quality of disintermediation: 
Thanks to their p2p structure, they enable personal interactions between 
users and service providers that may be absent in traditional commercial 
settings. Beyond housing-rental sites like AirBNB and VRBO, examples of sites 
facilitating disintermediation include JustPark (which allows you to park in 
someone’s residential garage instead of a parking structure), Appetit (which 
 
 118. This example is based on, and true to, my own experience. When teaching a summer 
course in London in 2015, I arranged to rent a flat near Russell Park from a lovely Londoner 
couple who were very helpful in showing me around the city, answering logistical questions, and 
otherwise providing a level of personal service that would have been missing at corporate housing 
or a hotel. Their motivation may not have been purely altruistic, of course. Being a personal point 
of contact for their renters can be a major selling point for other potential residents. It was 
certainly something I featured prominently in my very favorable review of my hosts. Not all home 
sharing experiences are unequivocally positive, of course. Some VRBO users have reported the 
opposite of my outstanding London 2015 experience. Nightmare stories include subpar 
accommodations, inconsiderate hosts, and financial scams. E.g., Paulina, VRBO House Rental Gone 
Bad, ELLIOT (Dec. 15, 2014), http://forum.elliott.org/threads/vrbo-house-rental-gone-bad.112 
(relating one particularly piquant horror story). Nevertheless, these stories are relatively rare and 
are held in check by vetting processes and user reviews.  
 119. See Buczynski, supra note 108 (describing the sharing economy as “a web of pleasant 
interdependence that acts as a support system, and cuts out the ‘middleman’ position usually 
occupied by business or government”); cf. Carol Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: 
Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 98 (2003) 
(“[C]ommerce constitutes the social glue of democratic self-governance—for example, that 
property and trade are a school for rights-consciousness, that commerce deflects people from 
ideological enmity, and that commerce teaches us to operate by consent rather than force.”). 
A1_FAGUNDES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/2018  5:31 PM 
1386 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1361 
allows you to have a gourmet dinner cooked at someone’s home rather than 
a restaurant), and WeWork (which allows you to rent office space from 
someone’s home office rather than going to a coffee shop or library). It bears 
noting that not all sharing platforms increase disintermediation beyond the 
status quo. Some sharing economy transactions, such as a purchase on Etsy or 
an Airbnb rental from a remote landlord, may involve no more personal 
interaction than a few businesslike exchanges online. And some services 
already typically involve interpersonal interaction, such as getting a ride in a 
private car or finding someone to walk your dogs. So, sites like Lyft or 
DogBuddy may make these services more readily available via online, app-
based platforms, but do not necessarily increase the relative level of personal 
interaction that these services entail.  
Why, one might ask, is disintermediation relevant to happiness? While 
Airbnb or Appetit may enable more personal interaction than staying in 
corporate housing or going to Applebee’s, they still generate only fleeting 
social ties. On one level, this point is right: The folks you run into when using 
services provided by the sharing economy aren’t likely to become your best 
friends. On the other hand, hedonics research has shown that few things are 
more productive of happiness generally than positive social interactions. And 
research has shown in a variety of settings and among people of different 
personality types (i.e., introverts and extroverts) that even interactions with 
those with whom we have weak social ties are causally related to greater 
happiness.120 These interactions appear to increase our sense of belonging as 
well as to diversify one’s social network, thereby providing a sense of support 
when stronger social ties are unavailable.121 The disintermediation produced 
by many sharing economy platforms thus contributes to happiness in this 
second, less obvious way: By increasing the kinds of pleasant, if ephemeral, 
interactions that comprise a part of our social network that complements 
stronger social ties like those with family and friends.122 Compared to the 
impersonal transactions that take place with the typical corporate monoliths, 
the proliferation of these sites promises a meaningful enhancement in net 
subjective well-being. 
3. Community 
Commercial exchange over some sharing economy platforms may also 
enhance happiness because it is more likely to encourage and enrich a sense 
of community. FreeCycle, for example, works because its users feel knit 
 
 120. Sandstrom & Dunn, supra note 74, at 920 (concluding that “the current results are 
consistent with the idea that the more peripheral members of our social network shape our day-
to-day happiness,” even if not as much as core members of those networks). 
 121. Id. at 918–20. 
 122. Id. at 920 (“So, chat with the coffee barista, work colleague, yoga classmate, and dog 
owner—these interactions may contribute meaningfully to our happiness, above and beyond the 
contribution of interactions with our close friends and family.”). 
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together in a community of like-minded individuals who share values of 
mutual aid and concern for the environment.123 This community-building 
effect holds true for commercial sites as well as “true sharing” platforms. Many 
sharing sites allow users to offer goods or services for a relatively low cost, so 
that if you need a belt sander or a bread slicer you can rent one cheaply rather 
than buy an expensive new one.124 These sites are, of course, limited to the 
local area in which people live, but this limitation necessarily forces people to 
interact with those in their local area, thereby enhancing otherwise-weak 
neighborhood social networks.125 At the opposite end of the geographical 
spectrum, travel sites like Couchsurfing create a sense of community among 
their users, not because they bring together people in the same geographic 
area, but rather because they forge bonds among citizens of far-flung nations, 
creating a sense of global togetherness.126 Finally, the very act of participation 
in the sharing economy can generate a sense of connectedness—even if that 
just means chatting with your Uber driver127—to the extent that many people 
regard taking part in the emergence of this new economic form of exchange 
 
 123. See GRANT, supra note 116, at 286 (“By fostering a common identity and opportunities 
for unique self-expression, Freecycle was able to mobilize a giving system based on generalized 
reciprocity: you give to help others in the community, and you know that someone in the 
community will give to you.”). 
 124. See, e.g., NEIGHBORROW, http://beta.neighborrow.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2018) 
(neighborhood-based general goods-rental site); RENT MY ITEMS, http://www.rentmyitems. 
com/how-it-works (last visited Mar. 13, 2018) (another example of a neighborhood-based  
goods rental site); MY RECYCLE STUFF, http://myrecyclestuff.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2018)  
(enabling neighbors to barter and swap items they no longer need); SPLINSTER, https:// 
www.spinlister.com/about (last visited Mar. 13, 2018) (rent your bike from a local resident); 
YARD CLUB, https://www.yardclub.com/about (last visited Mar. 13, 2018) (borrow a neighbor’s 
tools for a fee). 
 125. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (discussing the decline of the local neighborhood as a unit of 
social interaction in contemporary America). 
 126. COUCHSURFING, http://www.couchsurfing.com/about/how-it-works (last visited Mar. 13, 
2018) (promising users the opportunity to connect “to a global community of travelers” while they 
explore the world). 
 127. Indeed, Uber and Lyft both make efforts to obscure the economic character of the 
exchange between riders and drivers. Cash does not change hands; Lyft passengers even ride 
shotgun. The goal is to generate “a sense of trust and social connection.” Lobel, supra note 93, at 
113. This may, of course, be a ruse. Uber drivers are businesspeople just like traditional cabbies. 
But if users believe that their use of these services makes them part of a countercultural 
movement and/or connected to others who share their values, it would increase their subjective 
well-being regardless of whether their belief is actually valid. 
A1_FAGUNDES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/2018  5:31 PM 
1388 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1361 
as edgy and countercultural on the one hand,128 or forward-thinking and 
generous of spirit on the other.129 
These community-enhancing qualities represent a third way that the 
sharing economy promises to increase subjective well-being. First, the 
literature identifying a connection between happiness and sociality has found 
that one valence of this causal relationship is that a strong sense of group 
identity serves as a source of subjective well-being.130 A powerful sense of 
group identity gives people the notion that they belong to a larger collective 
of people who share some common belief or quality. Second, having a sense 
of belonging enhances subjective well-being because it leads people to feel 
safer and more secure.131 The notion that one can call on a broad network of 
individuals for help or support contributes to a subjective sense of security, 
and in turn, happiness. The sharing economy may generate this sense of 
community in a pair of ways. Neighborhood ties that grow out of Little Free 
Libraries (“LFLs”) or other contacts resulting from use of sharing platforms 
that allow neighbors to meet and interact may give people a connection to 
their local community that they would have otherwise lacked.132 In terms of 
security, the sharing economy actually does provide a number of quick and 
relatively lower-cost ways to address problems that are unavailable through 
standard means. For example, if your car breaks down and you cannot get in 
to work, the sharing economy provides a number of neighborhood-based 
options: taking an Uber, sharing a ride, using someone’s home office to work, 
or tasking someone to get the work and bring it to you. Finally, the personal 
contacts created through the disintermediated use of the sharing economy 
may lead to the formation of lasting relationships. For example, there are 
 
 128. Much of the sharing economy operates in a legal twilight zone, so that some people are 
drawn to it by the frisson of possible illegality that it entails, so that at the group level interactions 
can seem like taking part in a secret underground movement. Sarah Schindler, Regulating the 
Underground: Secret Supper Clubs, Pop-Up Restaurants, and the Role of Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
DIALOGUE 16, 26–32 (2015) (discussing the community-building and rebellious features of pop-
up dining and of the sharing economy more generally). Another valence of this point is that 
participation in the sharing economy simply makes people feel that they and other users are 
smarter than others by coming up with more efficient means of commerce than standard 
economic exchange. See Lobel, supra note 93, at 116 (observing that the sharing economy 
encourages a spirit “of community, openness, and bottom-up expansion”). 
 129. Many “true sharing” sites trade off this kind of sense that sharing makes us better people, 
especially “true sharing” sites such as Ask and Give or Couchsurfing.  
 130. Juliet Ruth Helen Wakefield et al., The Relationship Between Group Identification and 
Satisfaction with Life in a Cross-Cultural Community Sample, J. HAPPINESS STUD. 785, 786 (2016) 
(identifying positive relationship between group identification and subjective well-being, 
although measuring the latter in terms of life satisfaction). 
 131. See DANIEL M. HAYBRON, HAPPINESS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 54–55 (2013) 
(showing that security is one of the leading threshold criteria for happiness, and that happiness 
requires that we “feel secure in the possession of what matters”). 
 132. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text (cataloguing a number of different 
instances in which close community ties were strongly related to higher subjective well-being). 
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numerous reports of Couchsurfing users ending up in long-term relationships 
or even married.133 This means that the p2p character of the sharing economy 
can lead not only to the kind of fleeting interpersonal connections discussed 
above, but also to the stronger social ties that are even more robustly 
connected to happiness.134  
4. Access over Ownership 
The sharing economy may enhance happiness for a final reason. Some 
writers have argued that the distinctive feature of the sharing economy is not 
sharing, but using real and chattel property on an access, not an ownership, 
basis.135 The traditional model of property casts use as an incident of 
ownership: First you buy a home or a car or a pair of shoes, and then you are 
legally entitled to use it.136 But the sharing economy creates the promise of 
disentangling ownership from use entirely. If you have Airbnb and 
Couchsurfing, you may have sufficient access to housing to eliminate the need 
to buy a house. In a world where Uber and Lyft are readily available, you can 
simply access someone else’s car without having to own one. The same holds 
true of property from office space to power tools, and may signal a 
foundational change in how we perceive property itself.137 In a world of ready 
access, it is no longer necessary to regard ownership as a prerequisite to use, 
reducing the relevance of property title substantially.138 
Assuming that the sharing economy does represent a paradigm shift 
toward access and away from ownership, what does this mean for societal well-
being? One salient connection is that most of the hedonic downsides 
associated with property derive from ownership itself and its various economic 
and psychological burdens. Owning a house or a car entails upkeep and 
 
 133. See, e.g., Couchsurfing Love Story, ONCE A TRAVELER (July 15, 2012), http://www.oncea 
traveler.com/couchsurfing-love-story. 
 134. See Sandstrom & Dunn, supra note 74, at 920 (observing that generous interactions with 
those with whom we have strong social ties increases our happiness more than similar interactions 
with those with whom we have weak social ties). 
 135. See Giana M. Eckhardt & Fleura Bardhi, The Sharing Economy Isn’t About Sharing at All, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Jan. 28, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/01/the-sharing-economy-isnt-about-sharing-at-all 
(“[T]he sharing economy isn’t really a ‘sharing’ economy at all; it’s an access economy.”). 
 136. A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 557, 563–74 (Jules L. 
Coleman ed., 1999) (describing a taxonomy of property rights including the right to use). 
 137. See J.J. Colao, Welcome to the New Millennial Economy: Goodbye Ownership, Hello Access, 
FORBES (Oct. 11, 2012, 1:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2012/10/11/welcome-
to-the-new-millennial-economy-goodbye-ownership-hello-access (arguing that access paradigms 
are eclipsing traditional property models); Blake Morgan, NOwnership, No Problem: Why Millennials 
Value Experiences over Owning Things, FORBES (June 1, 2015, 12:18 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
blakemorgan/2015/06/01/nownershipnoproblem-nowners-millennials-value-experiences-over-
ownership (illustrating a change in preferences for access in lieu of ownership following the 2008 
economic crisis, especially for younger generations). 
 138. Title ownership would remain relevant for service providers in an access-oriented 
economy, but would decrease in relevance for end-user consumers.  
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maintenance, which cashes out in terms of both money and lost time.139 Most 
large-scale purchases also come with outsized debt burdens, which studies 
have shown to be distinctively psychologically harmful.140 And ownership—
particularly real property ownership—tends to limit mobility and the 
concomitant sense of personal freedom that is a cornerstone of high 
subjective well-being.141 There are short-term psychic upsides to making a big-
ticket purchase, of course, but these tend to be swamped in the longer term 
when hedonic adaptation and buyer’s remorse kick in.142 One might respond, 
of course, that these are necessary evils to function in modern society: You 
have to have a home and a car and some quantum of chattel property to live 
a normal life. But the sharing economy’s emergence suggests that this is no 
longer the case. VRBO, Lyft, and countless other sites have decoupled 
ownership from access. If you can get all the utility of a house, a car, or 
another type of property without having the happiness-sapping downsides of 
formal ownership that may present a way to capture the use needs supplied 
by property without the well-being costs researchers have shown ownership to 
create. This move away from formal ownership and toward access thus 
represents an additional reason that the sharing economy may enhance net 
social happiness. 
C. TOWARD HAPPIER SHARING 
The sharing economy has the capacity to improve net social welfare in a 
variety of ways that have been overlooked by the increasingly voluminous legal 
literature on this topic. This Part explores how these insights may translate 
into law.143 As discussed in detail in Part II, this is still a Benthamite utilitarian 
calculation, relying on a direct measure of welfare (subjective well-being) to 
measure utility. For example, a typical economics-inflected cost-benefit 
approach to a hypothetical law requiring Uber to give its drivers health care 
would primarily look at its upsides—saving employees on insurance costs, 
better health outcomes—and downsides—costs to employers, possible lost 
 
 139. See Fagundes, supra note 26, at 24–25 (discussing this and other practical costs of 
property ownership). 
 140. To paraphrase Dunn and Norton, what you owe is more important for your psychological 
well-being than what you own. See DUNN & NORTON, supra note 61, at 95 (cataloguing studies that 
members of households with greater debt tend to exhibit lower happiness). 
 141. See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 1093, 1104–05 (2009) (discussing the psychological downsides of reduced mobility  
for homeowners).  
 142. Travis J. Carter & Thomas Gilovich, The Relative Relativity of Material and Experiential 
Purchases, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 146, 153–56 (summarizing evidence for the 
proposition that the hedonic upsides of material purchases tend to be overwhelmed eventually 
by a sense of regret). 
 143. For a good, extended defense of using happiness as the criterion for welfare in cost-
benefit analysis, see generally John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis,  
62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013). 
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jobs to drivers. A hedonics analysis would look to the next-order impact of all 
these factors and subjective well-being, considering issues such as the outsized 
effect of unemployment on happiness, the relatively high hedonic impact of 
wage savings on the less wealthy, and the connection between health and 
subjective well-being.144 As this example illustrates, looking at these new forms 
of platform-based p2p exchange through the lens of hedonics highlights their 
capacity to affect and enhance subjective well-being in a way not captured by 
traditional cost-benefit analysis.  
But how would using the lens of hedonics change how law regulates the 
sharing economy? As we have seen, there are numerous ways that this 
emergent form of exchange promises to enhance happiness more than 
traditional commerce. So, for example, this perspective would militate against 
permitting landlords to bar their tenants from using a site like CouchSurfing, 
which tends to enhance subjective well-being substantially across various 
metrics. And the notion that access tends to enhance happiness more than 
ownership supplies one reason that policymakers should have a thumb on the 
scales in favor of that form of economic exchange. 
But the answer to this question is much more complex than simply 
equating all sharing economy commerce with greater subjective well-being. 
For one thing, not all sharing platforms exhibit the same tendency to improve 
subjective well-being. “True sharing” has the greatest capacity to enhance 
subjective well-being due to its enablement of altruism and the tendency to 
knit together closer human connections. Sites like Airbnb or Appetit may lack 
the altruistic component, but still contribute to greater strong and weak social 
bonds by bringing providers and users directly into contact with one another 
and cutting impersonal corporate intermediaries out of the loop. But sites like 
Uber and Lyft likely have little positive impact on subjective well-being, 
though there may be some to the extent that certain users regard their 
participation in the sharing economy to link them with others in a like-
minded, countercultural community. So while the kind of activity facilitated 
by the sharing economy certainly has a larger hedonic upside than traditional 
commercial exchange, this does not mean that law should categorically favor 
all phenomena that fall within this broad category. 
Moreover, considering the distinctive effect of the sharing economy on 
subjective well-being does not moot more traditional cost considerations. The 
hedonics framework this Article adopts remains a welfarist utilitarian one that 
seeks to favor any policy that increases net happiness.145 The above analysis 
focused on the proximal effects of sharing economy activity on subjective well-
 
 144. For a detailed discussion of how well-being analysis would work and why it would be a 
superior option to cost-benefit analysis, see BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 23, at 27–58. See also id. 
at 34–35 (providing a specific example of how cost-benefit analysis and well-being analysis would 
play out in the context of an OSHA regulation). 
 145. Id. at 7 (“The law should improve people’s quality of life. For it to do that, law-makers 
need a way to measure the effect of proposed laws on well-being.”). 
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being, but more distal effects matter too, and hedonics analysis would have a 
lot to say about this. For example, as the 2015 public demonstrations by cab-
driver unions in Europe against Uber suggested,146 one possible implication 
of the rise of Uber, Lyft and other drive-sharing companies is that traditional 
cabbies and car services will be put out of business. While one might generally 
dismiss this as an inevitable part of the creative destruction that characterizes 
a healthy capitalist economy, its implications in terms of happiness (at least in 
the short term) would also bring significant social costs. Of all the potential 
negative events in one’s life, few are as damaging to subjective well-being as 
unemployment,147 so a full-scale analysis of the happiness implications of 
regulations favoring the sharing economy’s many rider apps would have to 
wrestle with these downsides as well as their various hedonic upsides. By the 
same token, though, Uber and its cohorts (including car-sharing apps like 
Getaround.com and ride-sharing apps like Via) promise to reduce car 
ownership, pollution, and traffic congestion.148 These effects all cash out 
positively in terms of happiness, since both a cleaner environment and 
reduced commuting have been shown to be strongly associated with increased 
subjective well-being.149  
As the example of car-sharing services illustrates, analyzing the sharing 
economy through the lens of hedonics thus does not warrant the simplistic 
conclusion that the state should categorically favor it in all its iterations. 
Rather, it yields both the general proposition that this approach highlights 
important welfare effects of the sharing economy that have not been captured 
by the literature to date, and the more specific proposition that certain kinds 
of sharing bear particular promise for increasing our subjective well-being 
and should be favored by the state when regulating this novel form of 
economic exchange.  
The promise of this approach, though, is considerable. In terms of 
scholarship, it promises to provide a monist criterion of value that can allow 
 
 146. See Amar Toor, French Taxi Drivers Lock Down Paris in Huge Anti-Uber Protest, VERGE (June 25, 
2015, 6:04 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/6/25/8844649/french-taxi-driver-protest-uber-
pop-paris. 
 147. See Richard E. Lucas et al., Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life Satisfaction,  
15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 8, 8–9 (2004). This effect diminishes over time, though, so a full analysis would 
have to take into account the time-adjusted hedonic impacts, not just the static ones, due to job 
loss. See BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 23, at 34. 
 148. Sarah Emerson, Uber Wants Us to Think It’s Environmentally Friendly, But Is It?, 
MOTHERBOARD (May 23, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/78k 
kj9/is-uber-good-or-bad-for-the-environment (quoting Uber CEO Travis Kalanick as having 
stated that Uber will reduce pollution, traffic congestion, and the number of cars on the road). 
 149. See Ian Alcock et al., Longitudinal Effects on Mental Health of Moving to Greener and Less 
Green Urban Areas, 48 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1247, 1250–52 (2014) (cataloguing the mental upsides 
of living in less polluted environments); Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, Stress That Doesn’t Pay: The 
Commuting Paradox, 110 SCANDANAVIAN J. ECON. 339, 341–44 (2008) (discussing the substantial 
hedonic downsides of traffic and commuting). 
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the different costs and benefits generated by the sharing economy—which 
range from economic efficiency to concerns about racial justice—to scale 
along a single metric so they can be understood coherently together.150 And 
using well-being analysis also helps reframe some of the most vexing practical 
regulatory problems the sharing economy has posed. For years now, courts 
have wrestled with how to fit the sharing economy into laws written with only 
traditional modalities of exchange in mind.151 This effort has largely been a 
formalist endeavor, as parties have debated whether or not particular sharing 
platforms fit into preexisting legal categories. For example, towns have 
cracked down on use of private homes as Airbnb rentals, arguing that this use 
renders dwellings more like hotels than homes, and thus requires a 
commercial permit. Still other courts have rejected the categorization of 
Airbnb homes as hotels, and therefore rejected localities’ attempts to require 
permits for home-sharing.152 Similarly, traditional taxi companies have 
equated cabs and ride-sharing services, and filed legal challenges that would 
require Uber drivers to obtain livery licenses as a prerequisite to picking up 
passengers at airports.153 Hedonics analysis would sweep aside these largely 
unilluminating formalist debates, and instead reorient these debates around 
the much more important question of whether the type of sharing at issue 
would increase subjective well-being. One alternative approach could be to 
simply craft different regulations for sharing economy enterprises,154 which 
could favor or disfavor them based on their hedonic impacts.  
And it bears noting that looking at this issue through the lens of hedonics 
does not warrant carte blanche for any conduct by a sharing economy entity. 
Consider, for example, traditional taxi companies’ claims that Uber has falsely 
stated that they charge “standard taxi rates” and are affiliated with local cab 
companies. If true, these allegations amount to simple fraud, with no 
 
 150. Scaling different considerations on the same metric by using a well-being approach 
could, for example, allow standard concerns related to the sharing economy like economic 
efficiency to be compared and evaluated along with and against different ones like problems of 
racial injustice. See BRONSTEEN et al., supra note 23, at 34 (explaining that well-being analysis 
offers “subjective, hedonic, cardinal, and interpersonally comparable units that indicate the 
degree of a person’s happiness for a given period of time”). 
 151. See Zale, supra note 98, at 571 (observing the tendency of courts to resolve cases about 
the sharing economy based solely on formal categorical analysis); see also supra Part III.A 
(reflecting on the dominantly formalist character of legal and academic debates about the 
sharing economy). 
 152. See Fruchter v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 133 A.D.3d 1174, 1176 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). 
Taxi lobbyists have succeeded in ending Uber service in some cities, such as Austin, Texas.  
 153. Christopher Koopman, Bans on Uber Are About Cronyism—Not Safety, N.Y. POST (Feb. 16, 
2017, 7:57 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/02/16/bans-on-uber-are-about-cronyism-not-safety 
(decrying this outcome as “simply a pretext for protecting the stranglehold that existing taxi and 
livery companies have on transportation services across the state”). 
 154. Chicago’s solution to this problem was to create separate regulations for ride-sharing 
companies like Uber and Lyft as a prerequisite to permitting airport service, but exempting them from 
the livery license required of standard taxicab companies. See CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 9-104-030 (2017). 
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meaningful hedonic upside, and should be sanctioned as any other material 
misrepresentation would.155 Nor does a hedonics analysis require wholesale 
deregulation of the sharing economy on the theory that traditional 
regulations can never apply to the sharing economy. Regulation of housing, 
transportation, or other services is likely warranted in the interest of 
maximizing social welfare just as it may sometimes be in the traditional 
economy. The happiness approach simply urges courts and legislators to take 
account of the distinctive capacity of sharing economy entities to generate 
distinctively high subjective well-being when making regulatory decisions and 
applying relevant laws.156 
 
* * * 
 
By using an inclusion strategy with respect to their property—inviting 
people into their homes and cars rather than excluding them—users and 
providers have changed how we think about property. While this is a 
transformational commercial development, it represents far more than just 
an economic phenomenon. It brings the potential to enhance subjective well-
being in countless ways beyond commerce, by bringing people together, 
enabling other-oriented conduct, and freeing us from the sense of obligation 
to possess property in order to benefit from its use. Any policy analysis that 
seeks to capture the range of welfare effects wrought by the sharing economy 
has to consider these benefits and costs as well. Looking at the sharing 
economy through the lens of hedonics—as opposed to the standard 
economics-inflected cost-benefit analysis—promises to reconfigure how we 
see this new modality of exchange, and in so doing highlight heretofore 
unappreciated ways that the sharing economy makes us better off.  
IV. HAPPINESS AND CHARITABLE GIVING 
Sharing illustrates one way that inclusion is a welfare-enhancing property 
strategy. The same is true of dispossession. It may sound counterintuitive that 
getting rid of one’s property would improve well-being, but consider 
charitable donation. However corny one may justly regard all the aphorisms 
like “giving is better than receiving,” recent evidence reveals that they’re kind 
of true. One of the most striking findings of hedonics research is that giving 
generously to others greatly increases subjective well-being.157 This result 
 
 155. See Yellow Grp. LLC v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 12 C 7967, 2014 WL 3396055, at *2 (N.D. 
Ill. July 10, 2014); see also Ehret v. Uber Techs., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 3d 884, 888–89 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (certifying class action against Uber for misrepresenting that the 20% surcharge it 
imposed on certain rides was entirely a gratuity).  
 156. Courts were thus right to reject Airbnb’s CDA section 230 challenge to several cities’ 
application of land use regulations to owners using that home-sharing service. Airbnb, Inc. v. City 
and Cty. of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
 157. See supra Part II.B. 
A1_FAGUNDES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/2018  5:31 PM 
2018] WHY LESS PROPERTY IS MORE 1395 
spans different cultures and socioeconomic strata, and has been replicated 
many times with an unusually high number of subjects.158 Perhaps most 
surprising, the evidence shows that spending our resources on others brings 
us even more happiness than keeping those resources for ourselves.159  
This evidence suggests that if the state wants to help citizens maximize 
their well-being, its best strategy would be to encourage donations of time and 
money. While federal and local governments already support this through tax 
deductions, financial incentives for charitable donation may actually have the 
perverse effect of dampening the hedonic upsides of prosocial spending. A 
socially optimal system to maximize the happiness of donors and donees alike 
requires more attention to the multifaceted dynamic between charitable 
conduct and subjective well-being. This Part considers this problem in two 
steps. First, it shows how two behavioral phenomena—framing effects and 
crowding-out—combine to undermine the hedonic upsides of the charitable-
donation deduction. Second, it considers a variety of different choice 
architectures for how to maximize the happiness generated by charitable 
donation for givers and recipients alike.  
A. THE HEDONIC CASE AGAINST THE CHARITY DEDUCTION  
One area where the U.S. government initially appears to be succeeding 
from a hedonics perspective is tax policy,160 since one of the best-known and 
most-used tax breaks for individual taxpayers is the IRS deduction for 
charitable contributions.161 But does incentivizing prosocial giving with tax 
deductions actually increase subjective well-being? While this policy would, at 
first blush, seem to be a straightforward way to encourage happiness-
enhancing prosocial spending, the incentives story is not that simple. A 
growing body of work has cast doubt on the notion that financial incentives 
are invariably an efficient way to encourage desired conduct.162 A closer look 
at the charitable donation deduction reveals that two behavioral phenomena 
associated with this deduction—framing effects and crowding-out—may 
reduce, rather than enhance, societal well-being. 
 
 158. For examples of these studies, see supra note 62. 
 159. See Dunn et al., supra note 64, at 1687. 
 160. Any happiness upsides to the charitable giving tax deduction are inadvertent, of course, 
since the state does not articulate an explicitly hedonic case for offering this tax break.  
 161. 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (2012). The charitable contributions donation is the second-most 
used itemized deduction, after only the deduction for state and local taxes. Scott Greenberg, The 
Most Popular Itemized Deductions, TAX FOUNDATION (Feb. 29, 2016), https://taxfoundation. 
org/most-popular-itemized-deductions. 
 162. A leading example is CEO pay, where research has shown that giving corporate CEOs 
huge bonuses may actually decrease their efficiency, creativity, and productivity. See generally 
MICHAEL B. DORFF, INDISPENSABLE AND OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY EXPERIMENT FAILED 
AND HOW TO FIX IT (2014) (discussing whether CEO pay encourages desired business conduct).  
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One of the central reasons for altruism increasing happiness is that it 
focuses attention on the needs of others.163 There are other, less noble, 
reasons for the hedonic upsides of prosocial spending,164 but they all share 
this feature in common: Generosity increases subjective well-being only to the 
extent that it flows from sincere generosity, not from instrumental self-
betterment. And on the flip side, studies have shown that once you introduce 
an element of self-interest into the altruism equation—for example, giving to 
impress others or trying to fit in with social expectations—the hedonic effects 
largely evaporate.165 
The hedonic effects of altruism diminish with tax deductions for 
charitable donations because of two behavioral phenomena. The first is 
framing effects. How we understand anything is due as much to how it is 
presented as its own intrinsic content.166 Researchers have shown that 
encouraging subjects to “think like a scientist” versus giving a “gut reaction[]” 
triggered very different responses to identical information.167 The framing of 
the charitable-donation deduction thus casts a different, pecuniary light on 
altruistic acts. Consider, for example, the ubiquitous rider so many charities 
append to their appeals for generosity: “Give to us, it’s a good cause and tax-
deductible too!”168 So regardless of the motivation of or intention behind the 
charitable-donation deduction, it reads in terms of financial self-interest: If 
you give money to charity, you’ll save yourself money come tax time.  
One might respond by rightly pointing out that motives are often mixed, 
and that one might simultaneously want to help a good cause while also 
relishing a bit of tax relief. This intuition, though, is undercut by a second 
 
 163. See DUNN & NORTON, supra note 61, at 106–33 (cataloguing research that shares this 
common theme). 
 164. For example, giving can make people feel powerful and magnanimous because it 
emphasizes their relatively higher place in the social hierarchy than donees. See Chance & Norton, 
supra note 65, at 4–6. 
 165. See DUNN & NORTON, supra note 61, at 116 (observing that if giving is not a choice 
donors feel no happier as a result); Weinstein & Ryan, supra note 32, at 238–40 (showing that 
only noninstrumental giving measurably enhances happiness). 
 166. The cornerstone article on the topic is Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing 
of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981). 
 167. Ayanna K. Thomas & Peter R. Millar, Reducing the Framing Effect in Older and Younger 
Adults by Encouraging Analytic Processing, 67B J. GERONTOLOGY, SERIES B: PSYCHOL. SCI. & SOC. SCI. 
139, 144 (2012); see also Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 166, at 453 (showing that presenting 
an option as saving lives versus avoiding deaths changed how people preferred two identical 
hypothetical options). Sometimes framing effects seem random, if fascinating, such as the finding 
that college admissions officers place more weight on academic credentials if they review 
applications on a cloudy day. Uri Simonsohn, Clouds Make Nerds Look Good: Field Evidence of the 
Impact of Incidental Factors on Decision Making, 20 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 143, 151 (2007). 
 168. For just one major example, the Red Cross’s web page urging giving is titled “Give A 
Tax–Deductible Donation To The Red Cross.” Give a Tax–Deductible Donation to the Red Cross,  
AM. RED CROSS (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.redcross.org/news/article/Give-A-Tax-Deductible-
Donation-To-The-Red-Cross. 
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behavioral phenomenon: crowding-out. Dan Ariely and others have shown 
that self-interested and other-regarding motivations are profoundly different, 
and typically occupy separate, mutually exclusive spaces.169 Moreover, these 
motivations operate in a zero-sum game in which either selfishness or 
generosity prevails. This is why it is considered criminal to skip out of a 
restaurant without paying the bill, yet entirely rude to give your friend $50 on 
the way out of the dinner party they invited you to.170 But while self- and other-
oriented motivations compete, they are not created equal. On the contrary, 
research suggests that when you introduce even a drop of self-regarding, 
especially financial, motivation it tends to crowd out other-regarding 
motivations. Studies have found, for example, that merely referring to money 
when asking people to do a collaborative task reduced participants’ altruistic 
behavior and increased their sense of social distance from one another.171 
In light of these behavioral phenomena, the simple incentivist case for 
the charitable-donation deduction appears much more complicated. One 
may initially think that since prosocial spending tends to strongly increase our 
subjective well-being, seeking to encourage this behavior with tax relief is 
likely to enhance happiness. But the precondition for the positive relationship 
between altruism and subjective well-being is other-orientation; where giving 
is motivated by self-interest or other instrumentalist aims, it is unlikely to 
increase happiness. Thus, framing effects become salient. Thanks in large 
part to charities endlessly emphasizing the tax-deductible nature of gifts, the 
charitable-contribution deduction causes altruism to be understood as a self-
interested economic decision. Moreover, the crowding-out effect exacerbates 
the tax code’s tendency to frame donation in a financial light. While one may 
think that motivations to give may be an even mix of desire to help and 
concern for reducing one’s tax burden, behavioralists have found that self- 
and other-regarding operate to the exclusion of one another, and that the 
presence of the former—especially financial self-interest—tends to squelch 
altruism entirely. So however well-intentioned it may be, the charitable-
donation deduction likely cancels out any hedonic upsides of giving that 
donors would otherwise experience. 
 
 169. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 
75–88 (2008) (contrasting “market norms” of self-interested profit motivation with “social 
norms” of kindness and altruism); James Heyman & Dan Ariely, Effort for Payment: A Tale of Two 
Markets, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 787, 793 (2004). 
 170. See ARIELY, supra note 169, at 68–72 (citing this and other examples, such as the point 
that payment converts a consensual sex act into illegal prostitution, or the fact that lawyers refused 
to work for the AARP for a reduced rate of $30/hour but agreed to do so for free when it was 
presented as a pro bono gesture). 
 171. Relatedly, offering money can convert a licit sexual encounter into the crime of 
prostitution. See generally Vohs et al., supra note 79 (showing that subjects primed to think about 
money become more selfish and less willing to help others in tasks). 
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B. CHOICE ARCHITECTURE FOR HAPPIER DONATION 
Charitable donations represent a rare area in which the state encourages 
citizens to get rid of their property. The previous Subpart further showed, 
however, why tax deductions may cancel out the hedonic upside of 
widespread altruism. This does not mean that incentivizing prosocial 
dispossession of property is a lost cause, but only that a simplistic, financial-
incentives approach is not the optimal strategy. This Subpart explores how 
the state might construct alternative schemes that could simultaneously 
encourage charitable donation while also maximizing the subjective well-
being of donors and donees alike. To that end, it explores two types of choice 
architectures (pure libertarian and libertarian-paternalist) that seek to nudge 
people in the direction of giving without running headlong into the 
downsides.172  
1. Pure Libertarian Approaches 
One approach the state could take to capture the hedonic potential of 
altruism is to get out of the game altogether by eliminating any tax relief for 
donations. While counterintuitive, this policy has several features that 
recommend it. First, it does not overtly pressure giving at all, leaving 
individuals free to decide whether they want to donate.173 This would 
counteract the inadvertent but dominant financial framing of the current 
scheme that casts the act of donation as a means to get a tax break.174 This 
clears the way for the happiness upsides that flow from purely voluntary 
altruism. Another key consideration for this proposal is that very few donors 
end up getting any tax relief from their donations, since most taxpayers opt 
for the standard deduction that obviates the need to itemize deductions.175 
Getting rid of the charitable donation deduction would, for most donors, 
represent a net hedonic gain because it would come with no tax downside 
while recasting their act as the kind of unadulterated charity that is most likely 
to significantly improve subjective well-being.176  
The most plausible counter to removing tax breaks for charitable 
donation is that while such a move would increase donors’ subjective well-
 
 172. See generally Richard H. Thaler et al., Choice Architecture (Apr. 2, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1583509 (discussing the notions of choice architecture 
and libertarian paternalism). 
 173. See generally DUNN & NORTON, supra note 61 (showing that altruistic acts improve 
happiness only where they are undertaken freely and sincerely). 
 174. See supra Part IV.A. 
 175. Kay Bell, Standard or Itemized Tax Deduction?, BANKRATE (Jan. 5, 2017), http://bank 
rate.com/finance/taxes/standard-or-itemized-tax-deduction.aspx (noting that the IRS states that 
most taxpayers take the standard deduction and do not itemize any deductions, including for 
charitable donations). 
 176. See supra Part III.B (showing that only sincere, not instrumental, prosocial spending 
increases donors’ happiness). 
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being, it would reduce donations, causing greater harm to donees that would 
swamp any welfare gains to donors. This argument proceeds on a plausible 
premise: Removing the incentive to donate would reduce charitable 
donations. But is this premise empirically valid? There is some reason to think 
that removing monetary incentives for charitable giving would increase 
altruistic behavior. For example, Richard Titmuss’ famous study of blood 
banks found that donors who were not compensated gave blood more 
frequently (and of a higher quality, i.e., with less impurities) than blood 
donors who were paid.177 This line of research raises the surprising 
implication that people are motivated to give more by altruism than financial 
motivation. If that conclusion applies in this context, removing the financial 
framing of the charity deduction may not decrease donations nearly as much 
as one might expect, and may even increase them.178 
2. Libertarian-Paternalist Approaches 
Outright repeal of the charitable-donation deduction is not, of course, 
the state’s only possible response to these concerns. Moderate state 
intervention short of the current simplistic incentivist approach may also 
provide a way to maximize the overall subjective well-being generated by 
altruism for donors and donees alike. This requires what Cass Sunstein and 
Richard Thaler termed “choice architecture” that can more carefully calibrate 
 
 177. See generally RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO 
SOCIAL POLICY (1970) (reporting results of this pathbreaking study). Subsequent work has 
confirmed this result. See, e.g., Carl Mellström & Magnus Johannesson, Crowding out in Blood 
Donation: Was Titmuss Right?, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 845, 857 (2008) (finding that the crowding-
out effect in blood donation applies to women, though not to men, and suggesting that the 
introduction or mention of monetary reward cancels out altruistic motives). And numerous other 
studies have found similar results in related contexts. See, e.g., Matthew Chao, Demotivating Incentives and 
Motivation Crowding out in Charitable Giving, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 7301, 7306 (2017) 
(showing that giving donors thank-you gifts reduced donation rates in a fundraising campaign). 
 178. One global study did find a higher rate of charitable contribution in countries that 
provided tax incentives for charitable contributions. See Tax Incentives Worldwide Help  
Increase Charitable Donations Says New Global Study, ASS’N FUNDRAISING PROF’LS, 
http://www.afpnet.org/Audiences/ReportsResearchDetail.cfm?ItemNumber=28295 (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2018) (reporting results of a study indicating that charitable donation was 12% higher 
in nations with tax incentives for individual contributions). But this difference could be due to 
other factors, such as divergent economic conditions or nations’ distinct cultural attitudes toward 
generosity, and it bears noting that the study was undertaken by a lobbying group for fundraising 
professionals and their legal counsel. In a similar vein, when the federal government first offered a 
tax break for donating land for conservation easements in the early 1980s, see 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) 
(2012), the number of such real-property donations increased significantly. See Nancy A. 
McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement Donations—A Responsible Approach, 
31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 45–46 (2004). I thank Thomas Mitchell for drawing this fact to my attention.  
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the incentives of and impacts for donors, donees, and the state in a way that 
nudges them toward these outcomes.179  
First, consider a different form of incentive: matching donations in lieu 
of tax breaks. This would incentivize tax breaks without doing so by engaging 
the kind of financial framing effects that dampen donors’ subjective well-
being under the current system. The state could replace the charitable 
contribution deduction with a state-financed match. This strategy promises to 
be Pareto optimal180 insofar as it makes donors, donees, and the state better 
(or at least no worse) off. In terms of donors, a state-funded match provides a 
meaningful incentive by supercharging donations. Even a 15% match can 
mean that a charity would receive, say, $150 more for a $1000 donation. This 
avoids the framing and crowding-out effects of tax breaks because the 
incentive is cast in terms of benefits to others, not a financial break for the 
donor. Better still, it promises to bring donors more happiness by increasing 
the effective amount of their donation by whatever percentage the state 
agrees to match it.181 Donees would also come out better on this approach. 
Given the Titmuss evidence that financial incentives suppress altruism and 
other findings that matching programs tend to increase donation,182 the 
likelihood is that charities would fare at least as well, if not better, than they 
do under the present tax-relief regime. Even if the rate of individual giving 
declined slightly with a matching approach, the net impact on charities would 
be positive unless the rate of giving declined more than the amount of the 
match. Finally, the state would be no worse off and might even prefer a move 
to matching donations. For one thing, the tax deduction is highly costly to the 
federal government,183 so the move to a match would shift the state 
expenditure from a rebate to individual taxpayers to charities themselves. 
Even better, the state could calibrate the amount of the match to reduce 
expenditures so that the state pays less but still incentivizes giving.184 
Another possibility is a tiered-giving approach. Different scales of 
donations generate different welfare effects. Eliminating the present financial 
 
 179. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (describing low-level state interventions as a 
form of “libertarian paternalism” that can have outsized positive effects on behavior). 
 180. Sean Ingham, Pareto-optimality, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/ 
topic/Pareto-optimality (last visited Mar. 14, 2018) (defining this term as “a concept of efficiency 
used in the social sciences, including economics and political sciences”). 
 181. See supra notes 86–88. 
 182. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 183. Kay Bell, Eight Tax Breaks That Cost Uncle Sam Big Money, FOX BUS. (Jan. 13, 2012), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2011/08/31/eight-tax-breaks-that-cost-uncle-sam-big-
money.html (estimating that between 2010 and 2014 the charitable donation tax deduction will 
cost the federal government $182 billion). 
 184. For example, if the state now effectively subsidizes charitable donations at an effective 
rate of 20% via tax deductions, it could match donations at a rate of 15% and save money while 
providing a more effective incentive.  
A1_FAGUNDES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/2018  5:31 PM 
2018] WHY LESS PROPERTY IS MORE 1401 
framing for charitable donations means that a gift of $100 to the World 
Wildlife Fund is likely to bring the donor a little subjective well-being, and do 
a marginal bit of good for the donee charity. In this case, the impact on both 
donor and donee is relatively modest.185 However, this does not necessarily 
hold true for large-scale donations. Most donors who give massive gifts of six 
or more figures to charity do so with explicitly instrumental aims, including 
tax relief, public recognition, naming rights, or a spot on the charity’s board 
of directors. Such gifts may not bring the donor as much hedonic upside as a 
purely non-instrumental act of great generosity, but have a massive upside for 
the donees. This asymmetry between the welfare effects for donors and 
donees in the case of large-scale donations suggests that abandoning favorable 
tax treatment for large gifts would not be a wise move, since these donations 
are already driven by instrumental reasons, and since their welfare effects 
swamp any hedonic upsides for donors. High-impact donations also do not fit 
well with a matching approach, since they would prove enormously costly to 
the state and give disproportionate support to select charities from public 
coffers.186 
The hedonic calculus thus changes significantly when one compares the 
relatively common lower-level donations and the much rarer high-dollar-
amount donations. A ready solution for this concern would simply be to create 
two tiers of donations. Below a threshold level, say $10,000, donations would 
not be tax deductible but would be met with a government match, 
encouraging smaller donations while preserving their hedonic upsides. For 
donations of five figures and above, the favorable tax treatment would remain 
to reflect the importance of these larger gifts and the likelihood that the good 
they do swamps concerns about lost happiness for donors due to instrumental 
motivations. This tiering would thus balance concern for preserving large 
donations with creating better incentives for smaller ones, and would follow 
many other tax donations which toggle on and off at certain dollar 
thresholds.187 
A final way to think about choice architecture for maximizing the 
hedonic upside of donation would take account of another way that all 
altruism is not created equal. The literature on happiness and prosocial acts 
finds that three conditions are prerequisite for maximizing the positive 
 
 185. This does not, of course, mean that it is trivial as a matter of policy. If it were possible to 
increase the hedonic impact of donation even a small amount but for a large number of donors, 
the overall positive effect on societal well-being could be tremendous. Cf. THALER & SUNSTEIN, 
supra note 179 (discussing the positive impact of small but widely distributed welfare gains). 
 186. A related concern for publicly matching gifts for large-scale donations is that it would 
create entanglement between the state and religion in the cases of gifts to churches, raising 
Establishment Clause concerns. Thanks to Johnny Rex Buckles for pointing out this concern.  
 187. The mortgage interest tax deduction, for example, begins to phase out for individuals 
or couples who earn more than $300,000, reflecting the aim of this tax policy to encourage and 
benefit middle-class homeowners. 26 U.S.C. § 163 (2012). 
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relationship between the two: charity increases subjective well-being where it 
is voluntary and sincere; has a clearly identifiable positive effect; and where it 
facilitates positive social interactions.188 Another way to construct incentives 
for donation that would optimize the happiness generated by giving could 
calibrate the incentive—such as the percentage match discussed above—to 
the extent to which the donee charity met these criteria. 
Consider that the most typical form of giving is simply monetary transfers; 
giving $50 to the Sierra Club or $200 to the Heritage Foundation. These 
kinds of donations are less likely to bring hedonic benefits to donors because 
they involve no in-person interaction and fail to allow the giver to see any 
particular impact their gift has. By contrast, giving one’s time to a local charity 
or donating to purchase specific items for various organizations are much 
more likely to increase happiness, because such donations facilitate social 
connection while at the same time increasing the odds that one will see the 
benefits of one’s efforts in the community. This is not to say that remote 
donations to a favorite cause are hedonically hopeless. They just have to be 
crafted well. Contrast the standard “give the Red Cross $20” with the strategy 
used by giving website DonorsChoose.189 This site allows teachers in 
underfunded schools to specify particular items they need, which users can 
then specifically choose to fund.190 Recipients typically follow up with updates 
on the effect of the gift in their classroom so that the donor has a happiness-
enhancing reminder of the specific positive impact of her gift. 
Tax policy could be effective at encouraging these kinds of altruistic acts 
by choosing to prioritize them with higher matching gifts. So, for example, 
while gifts under a given threshold would generally be matched at 10%, those 
that meet the specified criteria could be matched at 20%. Volunteer services 
could also be counted as deductible.191 Giving one’s time is particularly 
productive of subjective well-being since it is more likely to create or enhance 
social ties and make an identifiable impact. These kinds of gentle nudges 
would preserve incentives for charity generally while pushing donors to prefer 
the kinds of charities that are more likely to have hedonic upsides, and also 
spurring donees to develop the kinds of innovations that could merit 
bumped-up matching funds.192 
 
* * * 
 
 188. See supra Part III.B (outlining these findings). 
 189. See About Us, DONORSCHOOSE, https://www.donorschoose.org/about (last visited Mar. 
13, 2018) (explaining how DonorsChoose works). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Currently, volunteer time or services are not tax deductible. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 526, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 6 (2017), https:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p526.pdf. 
 192. See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 179 (discussing the virtue of small 
interventions that can have big positive impacts). 
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Tax incentives designed to encourage charitable giving represent a rare 
instance in which law actively seeks to encourage the voluntary dispossession 
of property. While this policy seems promising from a hedonic perspective, 
this simple financial-incentivist approach falls apart upon closer examination. 
Framing donation as a financially self-serving decision may crowd out the 
purely generous instincts that lead altruism to increase happiness. This does 
not mean that the state should simply stop incentivizing charitable donation. 
Rather, the state needs to create a savvy choice architecture designed to 
maximize donation while preserving the hedonic upsides of giving. By 
replacing the present tax break with a series of tiered donation levels and 
matching incentives calibrated to particularly hedonically positive giving, state 
and federal governments can optimize subjective well-being through charity 
for donors and donees alike.  
V. HAPPINESS, LAW, AND THE NEW MINIMALISM 
Charitable contributions represent one way in which dispossession rather 
than possession of property can increase owners’—and society’s—overall well-
being. Another welfare-enhancing dispossession strategy is much simpler: just 
give it away. Just such an attitude toward possessions animates an approach 
this Article terms the “new minimalism.” This notion encompasses different 
kinds of property skeptics, from “freegans” and others who seek to reduce 
their chattel property ownership to dwellers that opt to live in tiny houses or 
micro-housing units. This Part explores the hedonic upsides of the new 
minimalism, first exploring how the trend toward owning less can make us 
happier. It then explores how law intersects with this trend, including both 
obstacles to voluntary dispossession as well as regulatory strategies that can 
make it easier to be happier by getting rid of belongings. 
A. THE JOY OF NOTHING: MINIMALISM & HAPPINESS 
Getting and having more things may remain the dominant cultural ideal, 
but there is a growing counter-trend of individuals who reject the fetishization 
of ownership and adopt lifestyles that seek to minimize rather than maximize 
their property. Adherents of the new minimalism seek to reduce, sometimes 
radically, their possessions, their living space, or both.193 This is not a new 
idea; philosophers have long touted the spiritual virtues of living simply and 
renouncing material possessions.194 The new minimalism that is on the rise in 
 
 193. See Kyle Chayka, The Oppressive Gospel of ‘Minimalism,’ N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 26, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/31/magazine/the-oppressive-gospel-of-minimalism.html 
(“Despite its connotations of absence, ‘minimalism’ has been popping up everywhere lately, like 
a bright algae bloom in the murk of postrecession America.”).  
 194. See WESTACOTT, supra note 15, at 6–20 (discussing historical proponents of anti-
materialism and minimalism). 
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contemporary America lies within this tradition, but has grown out of the 
Great Recession as a particular repudiation of capitalist excesses.  
One strain of the new minimalism focuses on skepticism about amassing 
personal possessions—what lawyers call chattel property. Some adherents of 
this view challenge themselves to own as few possessions as possible, such as 
outspoken tech multi-millionaire James Altucher, who owns only a bag of 
clothes, a phone, an iPad, and a laptop.195 A less extreme approach favors 
owning only that which is strictly necessary.196 Numerous others have 
embraced somewhat different aspects of the new minimalism,197 but all are 
linked by a conviction that an orientation toward possessive materialism does 
more harm than good, and that Americans would generally be better off with 
fewer things.198 A minimalist approach to chattels may also entail not just 
getting rid of possessions, but giving them to others who may enjoy them 
more. The trend toward “little free libraries”—tiny, private bookshelves 
typically located in people’s front yards that allow them to get rid of excess 
books by giving them to interested neighbors—illustrates this move.199 
Minimalism manifests in a preference for less real property as well. 
Consider, for example, the tiny house. These are micro-residences of no more 
than 500 square feet (and often fewer), which stand as a stark rejection of the 
“American dream” of owning as large a house as possible.200 Tiny houses are 
often mobile, sited in areas that do not necessarily require purchasing real 
property (a friend’s back yard or a vacant lot, for example),201 and are much 
 
 195. James Altucher, How Minimalism Brought Me Freedom and Joy, JAMES ALTUCHER, 
http://www.jamesaltucher.com/2016/04/minimalism-brought-freedom-joy (last visited Mar. 
15, 2018) (“I have one bag of clothes, one backpack with a computer, iPad, and phone.”). 
 196. For instance, Joshua Millburn and Ryan Nicodemus—who have adopted the self-styled 
moniker “the Minimalists”—have made public personae out of their personal transformation 
toward lifestyles organized by a more relaxed standard that defines minimalism simply as “a tool to 
rid yourself of life’s excess in favor of focusing on what’s important.” Joshua Fields Millburn & Ryan 
Nicodemus, What Is Minimalism?, MINIMALISTS, https://www.theminimalists.com/minimalism (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2018).  
 197. Minimalist FAQs, MNMLIST, http://mnmlist.com/minimalist-faqs (last visited Mar. 15, 
2018); Colin Wright, Minimalism Explained, EXILE LIFESTYLE (Sept. 15, 2010), http://exile 
lifestyle.com/minimalism-explained.  
 198. Minimalist Leo Babauta, for example, characterized minimalism as “a way to escape . . . 
the excesses of consumerism, material possessions, clutter, having too much to do, too much debt, 
too many distractions, too much noise. But too little meaning.” Minimalist FAQs, supra note 197. 
 199. For a good general description of this trend—and local government resistance to it—
see David L. Ulin, Literary Democracy in Action: ‘The Little Free Library Book,’ L.A. TIMES (Apr. 15, 
2015, 11:46 AM), http://www.latimes.com/books/jacketcopy/la-et-jc-literary-democracy-in-
action-the-little-free-library-book-20150415-story.html. 
 200. Chrystal Johnson, Deconstructing the Trend Towards (Constructing) Tiny Homes,  
EARTH911 (Feb. 20, 2015), https://earth911.com/home-garden/deconstructing-the-trend-
towards-constructing-tiny-homes (discussing the emergence of the tiny house trend). 
 201. Wilkinson, supra note 21 (describing the general characteristics of tiny houses, and 
noting that they are “roughly the size of a covered wagon”). 
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less expensive than traditional homes.202 Their increasing popularity is 
evident in the fact that both magazines (the aptly named Tiny House Magazine) 
and television shows (“Tiny House Nation” on the A&E Network) have 
cropped up devoted entirely to the tiny-house lifestyle. And while these visible 
outlets tout the trendier iterations of tiny homes chosen by individuals who 
could afford traditional houses but choose to scale down instead, they can also 
serve an important social need: housing for the economically disadvantaged. 
Community First Village, a 27-acre development in Austin County, Texas, 
consists solely of low-square-footage units dedicated for the chronically 
homeless.203 Similar developments have cropped up all over the country, 
inspired by the notion that tiny houses can provide a less expensive and more 
humane solution to homelessness than shelters.204 
Another instance of minimalism in real property is the rise of micro-
housing.205 These urban housing developments look like standard apartment 
complexes, but reverse the usual distribution of private and common space. 
The individual apartments in micro-housing units are diminutive, containing 
just enough room for a bed, a bathroom, and sometimes a Spartan kitchen. 
Micro-apartments compensate for this lack of size with a variety of shared 
amenities: communal kitchens, common rooms, and co-working spaces.206 
Some micro-housing units provide no space for residents’ vehicles but do have 
access to Zipcars and other ride-sharing services.207 By reversing the usual 
ratio of living and common space in an apartment building, micro-housing 
forces residents to significantly reduce what they own, instead focusing on 
friends and the local community for both comfort and necessities.208 
 
 202. Nina Glinski, Tiny Houses Big with U.S. Owners Seeking Economic Freedom, BLOOMBERG (July 
9, 2014, 9:10 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-09/tiny-houses-big-with 
-u-s-owners-seeking-economic-freedom (discussing reduced cost and mobility as two major 
motivations for moving into a tiny home). 
 203. Cindy Widner, Tiny Houses in Austin Are Helping the Homeless, but It Still Takes a Village, 
CURBED AUSTIN (May 17, 2016, 9:01 AM), https://austin.curbed.com/2016/5/17/11686368/ 
tiny-houses-austin-end-homelessness. 
 204. Nancy Cook, A Tiny House Grows in Washington, D.C., ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2013), https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/12/a-tiny-house-grows-in-washington-dc/425733 
(suggesting tiny homes provide a solution to urban affordable housing crises); Linda Federico-
O’Murchu, Tiny Houses: A Big Idea to End Homelessness, NBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2014, 12:13 AM), https:// 
www.nbcnews.com/business/real-estate/tiny-houses-big-idea-end-homelessness-n39316.  
 205. See John Infranca, Housing Changing Households: Regulatory Challenges for Micro-Units and 
Accessory Dwelling Units, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 61–67 (2014) (detailing the emergence and 
character of micro-housing). 
 206. See Tomio Geron, Collaborative Housing Aims to Build Housing for the Sharing Economy,  
FORBES (Sept. 24, 2013, 4:55 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/09/24/ 
collaborative-housing-aims-to-build-housing-for-the-sharing-economy (summarizing and describing 
this trend). 
 207. Id.  
 208. Id. (“If you look at the square footage of the private units [we] have, it will be more 
expensive per square foot of private space . . . . But there will be common space that’s spread 
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These trends fly in the face of cultural expectations about both real and 
chattel property. People are expected to guard their possessions and homes, 
not intentionally discard them or opt for more modest living quarters. Yet the 
minimalist rejection of possession may well make sense as an optimal strategy 
for maximizing one’s subjective well-being.209 Much of the evidence amassed 
by scholars of hedonics predicts just such a result,210 and minimalists’ own 
description of their experience with fewer possessions matches up with these 
predictions. While minimalists extol the virtues of discarding possessions for 
a number of reasons, there is a remarkable consistency to the leading reason 
for this choice: It made them happier. The very point of minimalism, 
according to Millburn and Nicodemus, is happiness:  
By incorporating minimalism into our lives, we’ve finally been able 
to find lasting happiness—and that’s what we’re all looking for, isn’t 
it? We all want to be happy. Minimalists search for happiness not 
through things, but through life itself . . . .211  
Having fewer possessions, report minimalists, led them to feel freer both 
physically and from monetary debt.212 One particularly salient positive change 
reported by adherents was the ability to get rid of storage units full of unused 
belongings that created both psychological dead weight and steep monthly 
rental fees.213 They reported that less concern with possessions led to a greater 
focus on their social ties and families.214 This effect is particularly pronounced 
in cases where owners gave up possessions with a prosocial aim in mind. One 
man reported that his Little Free Library brought him in touch with 
 
across for everyone. That’s one of the main ways to achieve affordability while achieving access to 
more amenities.” (alteration in original)). 
 209. Not everyone is a fan of minimalism. Some deride it as a bastion of elite privilege that 
ignores the experiences of those whose less fortunate lives have made it much more difficult to 
simply abandon their possessions. For one thoughtful criticism, see Arielle Bernstein, Marie Kondo 
and the Privilege of Clutter, ATLANTIC (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/ 
archive/2016/03/marie-kondo-and-the-privilege-of-clutter/475266 (noting that Syrian refugees 
cling on to the few things that give them a sense of permanence and hope, whether a crutch or 
a photo of family or a pet). 
 210. See supra Part III.B (cataloguing the results of studies about the fraught relationship 
between happiness and possession of real and chattel property). 
 211. Millburn & Nicodemus, supra note 196; see also Minimalist FAQs, supra note 197 (“As a 
result [of adopting a minimalist lifestyle], there is more happiness, peace, and joy, because we’ve 
made room for these things.”); Wright, supra note 197 (“The number of possessions you have 
doesn’t matter, but being able to live a happy life does.”). 
 212. Joshua Becker, Don’t Just De-clutter, De-own, BECOMING MINIMALIST, http://www. 
becomingminimalist.com/dont-just-declutter-de-own (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (advocating the 
upsides of debt reduction as part of a minimalist lifestyle). 
 213. For an unflinching look at the burgeoning self-storage industry as emblematic of “the 
great American propensity toward accumulating stuff,” see Jon Mooallem, The Self-Storage Self, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06self-storage-t.html. 
 214. See Minimalist FAQs, supra note 197 (“There’s more room for creating, for loved ones, 
for peace, for doing the things that give you joy.”).  
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neighbors, who expressed their appreciation for his generosity and found 
common ground in their shared literary interests.215 And voluntary 
dispossession generally countered the kind of materialist mindset that many 
minimalists cited as the main reason for their preexisting unhappiness.  
Owners of tiny houses also describe their experiences in terms of 
increased happiness. One tiny homeowner in Rhode Island reported that his 
simpler, mortgage-free lifestyle left him “infinitely happier” and brought him 
“complete peace of mind.”216 Other owners agreed that while their large 
home and mortgage made them feel “trapped,” their tiny homes freed them 
from having to “waste their time or be a slave to a house they don’t fully 
use.”217 The mobility of these units also affords their owners a degree of 
freedom unavailable for traditional homeowners.218  
Residents of micro-housing units cite greater subjective well-being too,219 
due in large part to the fact that the shared events and spaces within their 
complexes provide a sense of community in cities where social ties are typically 
hard to come by.220 Occupants of much smaller living spaces also report 
greater affinity for getting out of their dwellings and outdoors, leading to 
happiness-enhancing behavior like exercising, interacting with neighbors, 
and contemplating nature.221 There is also a necessary relationship between 
smaller dwellings and reduction of chattel property, since downsizing one’s 
real property requires one to limit one’s moveable possessions only to the 
truly necessary ones—thereby getting rid of the unnecessary possessions that 
tend to weigh us down and reduce subjective well-being. Jay Shafer, an early 
 
 215. Conor Friedersdorf, The Danger of Being Neighborly Without a Permit, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/02/little-free-library-
crackdown/385531 (reporting that one provider of a Little Free Library “knew he was  
onto something ‘when a 9-year-old boy knocked on his door one morning to say how  
much he liked the little library’”). And one leading website referred to Little Free  
Libraries as “tiny vestibule[s] of literary happiness.” Buy a Street Library, STREET LIBRARY,  
https://streetlibrary.org.au/what-is-a-street-library (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 216. See Glinski, supra note 202. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Cook, supra note 204 (noting that if people want to move tiny homes, “they can 
simply bring their homes along” rather than having to sell them). 
 219. See Microhousing: An Overview, MICRO SHOWCASE, http://microshowcase.com/ 
microdwell/microhousing-an-overview (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (“Many in the micro house 
movement come to it with a realization that happiness in their lives has never correlated with the 
size of the spaces they have inhabited. Some search for a simplicity of existence, the elegant 
economy of form of a well designed small structure, an added freedom when unshackled from 
unneeded rooms and unwelcome mortgages.”). 
 220. Kaysen, supra note 21 (cataloguing a real sense of community in micro-living 
arrangements, and observing that for one resident, “[t]he real perks [were] the people he . . . 
met along the way”). 
 221. See Microhousing: An Overview, supra note 219 (observing that many microhousing 
dwellers prefer “to spend more precious life energy than needed dedicated to the designing, 
building, financing, cleaning, furnishing, decorating, maintaining, and repairing, when we might 
better be loving, discovering, creating, traveling”). 
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creator of tiny homes, observed that living in smaller units “shows people how 
little some need to be happy, and how simply they can live if they choose.”222 
B. MINIMIZING PROPERTY THROUGH LAW 
Evidence shows that downscaling both real and chattel property tends to 
improve our subjective well-being. But what, if anything, should the state do 
about this? This Subpart considers four overlapping strategies the law might 
take to nudge Americans to acquire less property, and thereby lead possibly 
happier lives.   
1. Libertarian Non-Intervention 
One approach law could take toward the trend toward minimalism is to 
do nothing. Skepticism about possession has been growing in the United 
States since the Great Recession, and the best approach may be to simply allow 
it to continue without interference. The problem with this strategy is that law 
has already staked out a strong position in favor of incentivizing and lowering 
the costs of possessing property. This is most conspicuous in the context of 
residential housing. Evidence suggests that people are happier when they 
downscale to a smaller home than when they move to a larger one.223 Yet the 
federal government encourages people to do just the opposite in a number 
of ways. The Internal Revenue Code extends homeowners tax breaks for 
mortgage interest and property taxes,224 both of which result in larger tax 
breaks for larger houses. And the two leading government-sponsored entities, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both insure mortgages against default and 
purchase mortgages on the secondary market.225 These policies are overtly 
designed to further mortgage origination and spur homeownership.226  
In light of all this, one simple way the state could encourage movement 
toward smaller housing (tiny or otherwise) would be to get rid of the current 
fleet of home-purchase incentives that scale up in proportion to the size of 
 
 222. Glinski, supra note 202. 
 223. See Fagundes, supra note 26, at 1871–76. 
 224. I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(2)(D), 163(h)(3), 164(a)(1) (2012). The new tax bill passed in late 
2017 cut back on these tax deductions, but only somewhat. Now, state and local taxes (the latter 
of which includes property tax) will be capped at $10,000, while new homeowners will  
be allowed to deduct mortgage interest only on the first $750,000 of mortgage debt.  
Kathryn Vasel, Homeowners: Here’s What’s in the Tax Bill for You, CNN MONEY (Dec. 17, 2017, 12:17 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/17/real_estate/tax-bill-mortgage-property-tax-deductions/ 
index.html. 
 225. Let FHA Loans Help You, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., https://portal.hud.gov/hud 
portal/HUD?src=/buying/loans (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (providing an overview of this policy). 
 226. See Rob Alford, What Are the Origins of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae?, HIST. NEWS NETWORK 
(Sept. 18, 2008), http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/1849 (tracing the origins of both GSEs 
directly to the federal government’s intention of supporting and expanding homeownership). 
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one’s mortgage and/or home.227 The incentive effect of repealing the 
homeowner tax breaks and dialing back federal mortgage support would 
render tiny homes a more attractive option. Few, if any, tiny homes are 
supported by mortgages, since a major reason for opting for one is to live 
debt-free.228 And many tiny homes exist off the grid, on land they do not own, 
and/or are mobile,229 so owners may not pay any traditional property taxes.230 
Perhaps more important, though, widespread state subsidies for housing do 
much to support the still-widespread notion that owning a home—particularly 
a large home—is the American dream,231 since these policies express strong 
state endorsement of debt-supported homeownership.232 Rolling these 
policies back would render the state neutral on private citizens’ housing 
decisions, and leave them free to opt in favor of whatever housing would 
maximize their well-being considering state market distortion in their 
purchase decision calculus.233  
2. Nudges 
Alternatively, the state could take an active approach encouraging 
minimalism in property. The challenge with traditional financial incentives is 
that, as we have seen with charitable contributions,234 they risk crowding out 
the kinds of motivations that are likely to result in greater subjective well-
being.235 A better incentive could map the strategy discussed in the previous 
Part: Rather than giving people a financial reward for offloading their 
 
 227. There are numerous other social welfare gains from rolling back federal mortgage 
subsidies, not the least of which is that it would eliminate the federal government’s third largest 
tax expenditure and save the federal government $7.1 billion per year. I discuss this and other 
critiques of federal housing subsidies in Fagundes, supra note 26. Given the limited scope of this 
Article, though, I limit the discussion to the implications of these policies for the housing 
minimalism movement. 
 228. See Glinski, supra note 202 (quoting numerous owners of tiny homes who explain their 
decision largely in terms of freedom from mortgage debt). 
 229. See Wilkinson, supra note 21 (discussing mobility as one of the major upsides of living in 
a tiny home). 
 230. For one thing, a tiny home that is mobile may be classified as a vehicle, not real property. 
And tiny home owners often do not own the land they occupy, which means they are not on the 
hook for property taxes at all.  
 231. Suzy Khimm, Buying a Home: The American Dream that Won’t Die, MSNBC (July 10, 2014, 
12:48 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/homeownership-credit-access-minority-low-income-
mortgages (citing survey results and quoting words from President Obama reflecting the 
centrality of homeownership in American identity, even after the subprime mortgage crisis). 
 232. Debt itself is deadly to happiness, both because of the permanent sense of worry it causes in 
debtors and because of the nontrivial risk of default, which leads to a cascade effect of events (job loss, 
poor health, homelessness) that can drive down subjective well-being. See supra Part III.B. 
 233. It would, moreover, mitigate the chances of another subprime mortgage crisis taking 
place. That event was a perfect storm of happiness-reducing events: home dislocations, job losses, 
health costs, and a generalized sense of uncertainty and loss. 
 234. See supra Part IV. 
 235. See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text. 
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unwanted goods to charities, the state could give an additional percentage of 
the value of the donation to the charity. So, if you donate your old refrigerator 
to the Salvation Army, the state could pitch in 10% of its market value to that 
organization. This strategy would incentivize downsizing while increasing a 
donor’s happiness by framing the gift as a prosocial act of generosity rather 
than a self-interested financial decision.236 
The crowding-out concern is less salient in the context of minimalist real 
property. The reason that smaller housing results in higher subjective well-
being has nothing to do with altruistic motivations. It is instead a product of 
freeing oneself of the burdens of excessive ownership.237 Standard financial 
incentives thus may work well in this instance. For example, states could give 
tax incentives for people eliminating their mortgage debt rather than taking 
on burdensome new loans, pushing people to embrace low- or no-mortgage 
living options (like tiny houses), and toward less debt generally. A more 
radical move would be to penalize people for living in excessive quarters, such 
as property taxes that scale progressively with each additional thousand feet 
of square footage of an owner’s home. In contrast to the current tax code, this 
approach would penalize rather than reward possession of opulent houses. 
Another possibility would be giving tax credits for the construction of 
minimalist housing. This could apply to either individuals who construct their 
own tiny homes, or businesses that invest in the construction of tiny homes or 
micro-housing complexes. For construction companies skeptical of these 
novel forms of housing, economic incentives could tip the scales, increasing 
the availability of tiny homes and micro-housing while also lowering prices 
due to greater supply. 
3. Legal Status 
A third strategy would seek to normalize tiny houses and micro-housing 
units as a matter of law. Both of these minimalist forms of real property now 
exist in legal limbo under most municipal codes. For example, tiny houses 
may not count as houses at all. If they are on wheels, they fall within the ambit 
of vehicle codes,238 and are classified as either a semi-trailer, recreational 
vehicle, or mobile home.239 Each of these creates its own legal problems: 
trucks may not be used as residences; RVs can be lived in for only about 30 
days at a time; and mobile homes can be sited only in designated trailer parks, 
whose rules may not permit nonconforming structures. Stationary tiny houses 
also typically fail building codes’ threshold requirement of minimum square 
 
 236. See supra Part III.A (discussing framing, crowding-out, and their effect on altruism). 
 237. See supra Part V.A (discussing the various ways that downscaling property can lead to 
higher subjective well-being). 
 238. Rachel Keyser, A Government’s Guide to Tiny House Regulation, VIEWPOINT (Mar. 6, 
2017), http://www.viewpointcloud.com/blog/local-government-resources/governments-guide-
tiny-house-regulation. 
 239. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 550, 465, 396 (outlining these categories). 
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footage. Micro-housing developments raise different concerns. Urban zoning 
laws typically impose maximum-unit requirements to avoid overcrowding and 
assure minimum quality living conditions. Micro-housing buildings that 
eliminate resident parking would also violate local regulations requiring 
buildings have a minimum amount of parking.  
The peculiar legal status of minimalist housing is more than just a 
technical legal issue; it has real impacts on the capacity of these forms of 
housing to become an option for many. While interest in tiny homes grows, a 
dominant question about these residences is whether they are legal—and the 
universally given answer is that they are not.240 This uncertain status likely 
deters many individuals who would transition to a tiny home. The social costs 
are only part of the hedonic story, though. Current tiny-home dwellers may 
report higher happiness, but it remains dampened by the uncertainty created 
by their home’s liminal legal status. Much evidence confirms that insecurity 
about one’s property exacts major psychological costs,241 so the notion that 
city officials could fine or even destroy tiny homes for being non-conforming 
significantly reduces the happiness that owners experience.242 Related 
problems dog micro-housing. Many proposed developments have foundered 
on the shoals of unfriendly zoning boards unwilling to permit variances. In 
turn, developers interested in micro-housing are understandably loath to 
invest in these projects given their unique legal hurdles. On both of these 
fronts, the uncertain legal status of minimalist housing prevents it from 
reaching its happiness-maximizing potential. 
These challenges invite two tiers of solutions. In the longer term, the easy 
answer is to clarify the status of both tiny homes and micro-housing by revising 
local housing (and possibly also vehicle) codes to legalize minimalist housing. 
Building codes could craft rules for micro dwellings, while zoning regulations 
could establish and enforce distinctive standards for micro-housing. This 
would eliminate the uncertainty that currently deters some individuals from 
investing in micro housing. Dedicated building codes for tiny houses could 
also create appropriate safety standards, as standard codes make no sense as 
applied to tiny homes.243 Additionally, reforms could address concerns that 
 
 240. E.g., Ryan Mitchell, How to Get Started: A Practical Guide Part 6, TINY LIFE (June 30, 2011), 
http://thetinylife.com/how-to-get-started-a-practical-guide-part-6 (“The legality of Tiny Houses 
is really the skeleton in the closet of Tiny Houses; in most instances, it isn’t legal, there is no other 
way of putting it.”).  
 241. Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437, 455–61 (2011) (discussing 
psychological harms of property dispossession); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967) 
(discussing the “demoralization costs” of lost property) . 
 242. See Mitchell, supra note 240 (identifying these possible penalties, as well as cutoff of local 
services, as possible threats tiny-home dwellers constantly live with).  
 243. One simplifying option would be to adopt the standards of the International Residential 
Code (“IRC”), which is continually updated to reflect modern housing trends, including the 
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micro-housing does not meet the same quality control standards of typical 
apartment buildings.244  
Given the difficulty of substantial revisions of local law, shorter-term and 
lower-cost strategies also merit consideration. One approach would be to 
simply tweak present laws to facilitate usage of minimalist housing. For 
example, one North Carolina county altered its vehicle code to permit 
residents to occupy RVs without any time limit, thereby legalizing at least 
mobile tiny homes.245 Localities could also lower their minimum square 
footage requirement so that tiny houses are not categorically rendered 
illegal.246 In terms of micro-housing developments, similar solutions are 
available. For instance, building codes could permit individual units of a 
smaller size in buildings that also offered a minimum amount of shared 
common space.247 Zoning boards could also adopt policies of presumptively 
extending variances to micro-housing developments for features like parking 
requirements that fail to reflect the distinctive populations of these buildings.  
Finally, while zoning and building codes related mostly to the nexus of 
minimalism and real property, they also offer at least one interesting 
application to chattel property minimalism. For example, Little Free Libraries 
have garnered local support and enhanced the subjective well-being of owners 
and recipients, but they have also run afoul of various local laws. Officials in 
Los Angeles, Shreveport, and St. Paul have ordered owners to remove their 
little free libraries for violating city codes.248 While some cities have 
relented,249 others continue to block the Little Free Libraries. Some of these 
stories have happy endings: After public outrage at the threatened citations, 
 
move toward tiny houses. INT’L RES. CODE §§ R304–06 (2015) (establishing safety standard that 
accounts for smaller housing units). 
 244. Claire Thompson, A (Very Small) Room with a View, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://www.hcn.org/issues/46.1/a-very-small-room-with-a-view (reporting plans of Seattle 
Department of Planning and Development to revise its regulations to require micro-housing to 
undergo the same). 
 245. Keyser, supra note 238 (discussing changing local laws). 
 246. For example, the International Residential Code requires a minimum of only 88 square 
feet (a 70 square foot room and an 18 square foot bathroom). INT’L RES. CODE § R304.1 
(“Habitable rooms shall have a floor area of not less than 70 square feet.”); id. § R306.1 (“Every 
dwelling unit shall be provided with a water closet, lavatory, and a bathtub or shower.”); id.  
§ R307.1 (establishing the minimum space for bathroom fixtures). 
 247. The city of Seattle proposed a law in 2013 to define and systematize  
micro-housing in a major urban area. See SEATTLE, WA., DPD MICRO-HOUSING AND 
CONGREGATE RESIDENCES SEPA DRAFT (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.seattle.gov/dpd/vault/ 
cs/groups/pan/@pan/documents/web_informational/s010441.pdf. 
 248. Michael Schaub, Little Free Libraries on the Wrong Side of the Law, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015, 
11:30 AM), http://beta.latimes.com/books/jacketcopy/la-et-jc-little-free-libraries-on-the-wrong-
side-of-the-law-20150204-story.html.  
 249. See, e.g., Alexandria Burris, Little Free Libraries Now Legal, SHREVEPORT TIMES (Oct. 27, 
2015, 11:01 PM), http://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/news/local/2015/10/27/little-free-
libraries-ordinance-vote/74689970. 
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Shreveport revised its local law to permit Little Free Libraries that met certain 
safety conditions.250 Los Angeles, though, remains ambivalent about them, 
and Dallas continues to take a hard line on Little Free Libraries despite the 
unpopularity of this stance.251 Here, the legal intervention seems obvious 
from a welfarist perspective. Since there is no indication that Little Free 
Libraries impose social costs and hedonics studies and anecdotes indicate that 
they are highly beneficial, scrapping regulatory limits seems like not only a 
welfare enhancing but a Pareto-optimal move.252 
4. Targeted Abandonment 
Finally, if getting rid of excess possessions makes us happier, perhaps law 
should smooth owners’ paths to doing so via the doctrine of abandonment. 
Common law generally permits the abandonment of most chattel property253 
by voluntary relinquishment of title;254 though it bars owners from 
abandoning their real property.255 Some scholars have disputed whether law’s 
formally permissive approach toward chattel abandonment translates into 
practical freedom to get rid of one’s property. Eduardo Peñalver has argued 
that while owners of personalty may have a theoretical right to abandon it, 
actually doing so is much harder than it seems. This is for several reasons: 
regulations limit the abandonment of the most noxious objects, like trash; 
acts of abandonment are unappealing on one’s own real property but amount 
to trespass against others’ land;256 and ambiguity about the intent to abandon 
goods often leads to their being returned to their previous owners.257 
 
 250. Id. 
 251. Dan Solomon, Dallas Is Regulating “Little Free Libraries” for Some Reason, TEXAS MONTHLY (Sept. 
14, 2016), https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-daily-post/dallas-regulating-little-free-libraries-reason. 
 252. See Friedersdorf, supra note 215 (“Those exploiting overly broad laws to urge that [little 
free libraries] be torn down are a national disgrace.”). 
 253. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191, 196 (2010) 
(“[T]he standard hornbook rule is deceptively simple: chattels may be freely abandoned.”).  
 254. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 4.03[B][1] (4th ed. 2017) 
(explaining that abandonment of property occurs “when the owner . . . intends to relinquish all 
right, title, and interest in it”). While most U.S. jurisdictions permit abandonment of chattels as 
a background principle, others vary their regulatory strategies or except certain subject matter 
(e.g., pets) from this principle. For a fascinating overview of legal strategies relating to 
abandonment, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 390–405 
(2010) (outlining a taxonomy of abandonment regimes); see also UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT  
§§ 2(a), 4 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1995) (allocating unclaimed property to state after specified time). 
 255. This asymmetry dates to the Middle Ages, when both freeholders and leaseholders were 
prevented from abandoning their land in order to secure the constant payment of feudal 
incidents to the Crown. Strahilevitz, supra note 254, at 399. Modernly, the rationale is similar: 
Bars on the abandonment of real property assure, among other things, that the state will continue 
to receive property taxes for private land. Id. at 399–400. 
 256. See Peñalver, supra note 253, at 204. 
 257. Id. at 202–08 (discussing these and other practical constraints on the right to abandon). 
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At first blush, the hedonic downsides of possession may suggest that the 
law’s best strategy would be to reverse the common law antipathy toward 
abandoning land and to remove practical obstacles in the way of abandoning 
chattel property. While this may improve the well-being of owners, other 
concerns counsel caution legalizing all abandonment. For one thing, while 
owners may benefit from this change, free and easy abandonment may inflict 
societal costs—pollution, clutter, pricey cleanup services, as well as costly and 
possibly violent races to become the new owner.258 Moreover, one may 
plausibly ask what would incentivize an owner to abandon property even if the 
practice were widely legal. The only property that we should want owners to 
abandon would be that with some social value, in which case an owner will be 
unlikely to part with it.259  
Lior Strahilevitz has sought to solve this dilemma by arguing that law 
should permit abandonment only when the property has positive market 
value.260 This proposal has the appealing upside of avoiding the socially costly 
offloading of useless or harmful property. But this scheme could be 
challenging to administer, which Strahilevitz acknowledges.261 On the other 
hand, this concern assumes that this doctrine can lead to only “generalized 
altruism,” and that the best benchmark of value to check suboptimal 
abandonment is objective market value.262 But what makes an act of 
abandonment welfare-enhancing from a hedonics perspective is not its fair 
market value, but rather whether the recipient derives subjective well-being 
from it.263 
This concern suggests a novel administrative solution to operationalizing 
Strahilevitz’ abandonment proposal. Consider a hypothetical “Up for Grabs” 
registry, a state-run exchange on which needy people below some income 
 
 258. See Strahilevitz, supra note 254, at 372–75 (discussing social costs of abandonment, such 
as races to possess, cleanup costs, and causing goods and land to fall into disrepair).  
 259. But cf. id. at 362 fig.1 (cataloguing forms of abandoned property and illustrating that 
even property valued by its owner may be abandoned, as with “major league baseballs” and the 
practice of “making it rain”). 
 260. Id. at 407. 
 261. Id. at 408–12. 
 262. Id. at 419. Strahilevitz explains further that “[p]ositive-market-value properties present 
the most compelling case for a permissive rule regarding abandonment.” Id. at 407. 
 263. For example, an out-of-date refrigerator could have virtually no market value because 
people are willing to buy only new or fairly new refrigerators. But for someone without much 
income, even an out-of-date, less stylish fridge could be hugely useful. So, while the fair market 
value of the fridge measured by aggregate preferences could be zero or even negative (if, for 
example, the owner would have to pay to have it hauled off), as long as the fridge goes to someone 
who will value it, that is clearly a welfare-maximizing transfer. The goal of abandonment should 
thus not be to require that people abandon positive market-value property, but rather, that they 
abandon property that brings subjective value to someone who will soon acquire it. The former 
may be a decent proxy for the latter, but it is not the same.  
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threshold264 could indicate things they needed, or even wanted, but could not 
afford.265 On the other side of the registry, those above the income threshold 
could list things they had but did not need and were willing to give away. 
People in each category could search and respond to the listings for potential 
matches, and takers would be able to acquire the “up for grabs” property if 
they retrieved it in a reasonable time window.266 This approach solves the 
market-price evaluation problem through revealed preferences. If an owner 
seeks to abandon Good A and someone takes it in a week, we can reasonably 
assume that it had positive subjective value that ratifies the former owner’s 
dispossession as a legal act of abandonment. If no one wants Good A after a 
given time, say three months, then that allows an inference that Good A does 
not bring anyone enough subjective value to render the abandonment valid, 
and the former owner would be obliged to maintain possession of it.  
The Up for Grabs registry could be changed in a couple ways to optimize 
its generation of subjective well-being. First, it could operate locally, so that 
abandoners would be more likely to see or know the person in their 
community who benefited from their former property.267 Second, it would 
provide the abandoner with information about the recipient of the good, so 
that the former owner would experience the distinctive happiness of giving to 
a particular individual, not just an anonymous person.268 And there could be 
an option for in-person handovers of the goods, further amplifying the “warm 
glow” to the abandoner and producing at least some weak social ties in the 
process.269 While the upside of shifting property to higher-value uses may 
alone justify this kind of targeted abandonment,270 hedonics evidence adds 
 
 264. A very rough cutoff point could be a household income below $75,000, which studies have 
suggested is the threshold for U.S. families at which additional possessions appear to bring no 
additional subjective well-being. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Angus Deaton, High Income 
Improves Evaluation of Life but Not Emotional Well-being, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 16489 (2010) 
(reporting results of study that income beyond $75,000 did not improve affective well-being). 
 265. There are already private registries of unclaimed property, but they exist mostly to help 
those who are entitled to funds recover them. See The Unclaimed Property Clearinghouse (“UPCH”), 
UNCLAIMED PROP. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.acsupch.com (last visited Mar. 16, 2018). 
 266. How is this abandonment rather than donative transfer? The answer lies in the “up for 
grabs” character of the registry. Owners cede their rights the moment they place something on 
the registry and cannot pick who takes the property or deny someone who calls dibs on it.  
 267. See Aknin et al., supra note 29, at 15 (reporting results of study indicating that giving 
with local ties enhances well-being more than other charitable activity). 
 268. See id. at 2 (showing that prosocial giving creates more subjective well-being when the 
recipient is a clearly identifiable individual, not just a general cause). For a great example of a 
charity that specifically identifies recipients of donation, and also just a great cause generally, see 
DONORSCHOOSE.ORG, https://www.donorschoose.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2018). 
 269. See Anik et al., supra note 63, at 5–6 (reporting study results showing that prosocial spending 
results in greater affective happiness when it entails some direct social contact with recipient). 
 270. Strahilevitz, supra note 254, at 414 (“[A]bandonment of such resources often facilitates 
their reuse or recycling by a high-value user.”). 
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the insight that such a program may do as much or more for those who gave 
than for those who received, true to the old Biblical aphorism.271  
 
* * * 
 
Another simple dispossession strategy is to reduce what property people 
already have, whether that means discarding unnecessary possessions or 
downscaling to radically more modest living quarters. The evidence that these 
dispossessive approaches to property is strong, which raises the corollary 
question what if anything law can do to nudge owners in this direction. This 
Part discussed several forms of choice architecture—understated incentives, 
revisiting legal status, and targeted abandonment—that would nudge people 
in the direction of minimalism in the interest of enhancing owners’ and 
others’ happiness. 
VI. CONCLUSION: IN [QUALIFIED] DEFENSE OF EXCLUSION & POSSESSION 
This Article has sought to show that while exclusion and possession 
dominate our legal and cultural understanding of property, inclusion and 
dispossession strategies are actually superior ways to maximize overall social 
welfare. The evidence from the new science of happiness—hedonics—shows 
that sharing property, giving it to charity, or just getting rid of it tend to 
increase overall well-being to a greater extent than amassing and guarding 
fortunes or land. In concluding, this Article briefly reflects on what these 
findings mean for property theory more generally.  
The major fault line in property currently pits exclusion theorists against 
enthusiasts of a progressive approach.272 Working with the toolkit of 
neoclassical law and economics, exclusion theorists typically stress the welfare-
enhancing potential of strong owners’ rights. Clearly delineating property 
entitlements, the argument goes, lowers information costs about who owns 
what, thereby maximizing efficient transfers and in turn overall social 
welfare.273 Progressives, by contrast, question the coherence of law and 
economics as the sole way to think about property, critiquing its value monism 
and preferring instead to regard property through a pluralist lens.274 This 
 
 271. Owners are, of course, always free to donate to charities. The relative advantage of the 
Up for Grabs registry would be that it channels the act of dispossession in ways designed to 
maximize the happiness of the former and new owners of the chattel. 
 272. For a good overview of this debate, see generally Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and 
Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 107 (2013). 
 273. Henry Smith’s information-cost defense of owners’ rights is one example of this 
argument. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S453–57 (2002). 
 274. See generally Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 743 (2009) (outlining and advocating the progressive approach while critiquing the law and 
economics approach). 
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pluralist approach considers values beyond market calculations to include 
nonmarket value, individual dignity, and distributive justice. In so doing, the 
progressive-property approach tends to deemphasize exclusion rights and 
attend more closely to the interests of non-owners in property law.275  
These fault lines trace at least to the middle of the last century, forming 
the latest part of a dialogue that can be located in Demsetz’s views of the 
normative appeal of the emergence of private property on one hand and the 
distributive-justice and anti-commodification critics on the other.276 New or 
old, though, the basic opposition remains the same. One side of this debate 
extols the private rights of owners as socially beneficial ways to maximize well-
being through wealth accumulation, while the other looks askance at the right 
to exclude as a shortsighted way of thinking about ownership that leaves out 
critical human values and considerations.  
This Article’s exploration of inclusion and dispossession may initially 
seem like a shot across the bow at property itself, since it is rhetorically arrayed 
in opposition to core ownership notions of exclusion and possession. But such 
a view profoundly misunderstands this Article’s central claim. The argument 
is not that the rights to exclude or possess are inherently problematic. Rather, 
strategies of inclusion and dispossession are most likely to enhance overall 
social welfare. This in turn illustrates that the current debate over the right to 
exclude represents a false opposition. A strong right to exclude may be 
socially optimal, but this is not dominantly because owners’ rights enable 
private wealth maximization. Rather, rights of exclusion and possession are 
necessary as prerequisites to enable the kinds of inclusive and dispossessive 
acts that are most likely to increase owners’ well-being, and society’s net 
welfare. To be able to share one’s property, or donate it, or give it away, 
presupposes that you possess the freedom to do what you want with what you 
own. The voluntary other-oriented conduct that maximizes the well-being of 
owners and society depends on strong rights of exclusion and possession.277 
The rights to exclude and possess thus seem to present a paradox. They 
are conceptually opposed to the kind of inclusion and dispossession that 
increase overall social welfare, but they are required to enable owners to 
engage in welfare-enhancing conduct. As writers from Aristotle278 to Carol 
 
 275. See supra note 31. 
 276. Compare Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. ASS’N 347, 
350–54 (1967) (making the descriptive and normative case for the spontaneous development of 
property rights), with Emily Marden, The Neem Tree Patent: International Conflict over the 
Commodification of Life, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 279, 292–93 (1999) (discussing distributive 
justice concerns related to propertization of traditional remedies by pharmaceutical companies), 
and Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1874 (1987). 
 277. Progressive property theorists have made just this point with respect to their own work. 
See, e.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 884 n.251 (2009). 
 278. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 16, at 89 (defending property rights as a means to enable the virtue 
of generosity in owners). 
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Rose279 have suggested, the answer to this apparent puzzle is that property is 
a deeply humane institution because of, not despite, its being structured 
around owners’ rights. Exclusion and possession do not allow owners to exit 
from society and protect their belongings, but leave them free to voluntarily 
engage in altruistic conduct and build bridges with their local and broader 
communities.280 The lesson is that ownership entitlements leave people free 
to engage in the kinds of prosocial conduct that are generative of individual 
and social welfare.281 The role of the law in this dynamic is necessarily limited, 
since this kind of conduct generates subjective well-being only when it is 
unfettered by state coercion. With this limitation in mind, this Article has 
sought to explore a variety of ways that law might move owners toward sharing, 
donating, and getting rid of their property. Developing choice architecture in 
the interest of promoting inclusion and dispossession holds the promise of 
leveraging the institution of property, not by cabining owners’ rights, but by 




 279. See Carol M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places?, 114 YALE L.J. 991, 1019 (2005) 
(reviewing MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2003), and KAREN R. MERRILL, 
PUBLIC LANDS AND POLITICAL MEANING: RANCHERS, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE PROPERTY 
BETWEEN THEM (2002)) (arguing that “[p]roperty is one of the most sociable institutions that 
human beings have created, depending as it does on mutual forbearance and on the recognition 
of and respect for the claims of others”).  
 280. Rose, supra note 119, at 98–99 (discussing property’s capacity to create sociality, 
commerce, and community). 
 281. As Rosser observed, “where is the virtue if the law gives you no choice but to be virtuous?” 
Rosser, supra note 272, at 118. 
